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A NEW FORM OF WMD? DRIVING WITH MOBILE
DEVICE AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
Linda C. Fentiman*
INTRODUCTION
Cell phones and other mobile communication devices' feature
prominently in current media accounts of traffic disasters. Stories of young
drivers who kill-and are killed-while texting,2 tales of bicyclists and
pedestrians killed by cell phone-wielding drivers,3 and accounts of deadly crashes
caused by distracted driving make newspaper and Intemet headlines.4 A recent
study found that texting by drivers increased fifty percent from 2009 to 2010,
with nearly one-fifth of motorists responding to a survey admitting that they have
texted or emailed while driving, despite an increasing number of states that have
enacted bans on this conduct.5 Teens are especially likely to text while driving.
6
Many drivers say they feel less safe on the road than in previous years, with
. Linda C. Fentiman is the James D. Hopkins Professor at Pace University Law School, where she
specializes in health law and policy and criminal law. She holds a B.S. from Cornell University, a
J.D. from S.U.N.Y. Buffalo Law School, and an LL.M. from Harvard Law School. She is grateful
for the helpful feedback she has received from Professor Peter Jacobson and the research assistance
provided by Kim Pierce Cortes, Heather Deichler, Anthony Desiato, Lynn Donohue, Amanda
Evanson, Nidhi Garg, and Reena Paraguya.
Throughout this article, I will use "mobile devices" as a generic term, recognizing that these
devices increasingly function as much more than phones and that outside the United States they are
typically referred to as "mobiles."
2 See, e.g., Larry Copeland, Word to Youth: Texting, Driving Don't Mix: AT&T is the Latest
Company to Push Safety Campaign, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 8, 2010, at A5; Robert Mills, Lowell:
Tewksbury Man Killed in Lowell Crash Was Texting, THE SUN (Lowell, Mass.), Dec. 15, 2009;
Andrew J. Nelson, Texting, Speeding Cited in Fatal Crash: The Iowa Teen Faces Motor Vehicle
Homicide Charges in the Accident That Killed Two Preschoolers, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr.
28, 2011, at Al; Press Release, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., No Call, No Text, No Update Behind the
Wheel: NTSB Calls For Nationwide Ban on PEDs While Driving (Dec. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2011/111213.html.
3 See, e.g., Cynthia Dizikes, Facebook User Sued in Fatal Crash: Motorist Accused of Updating
Page While Driving, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 2011, at C13; Patricia C. McCarter, Cell Phone Use Cited
in Death, HUNTSVILLE TIMES (Huntsville, Ala.), July 31, 2009, at Al; Emily Opilo, Driver Was
Using Cell Phone During Crash That Killed a Harrisburg Teacher, Court Reports Say,
PENNLIVE.COM (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2009/09/
driver was usingcellphone du.html.
4 See, e.g., David Chanen, Motorist Gets 4 Years in Crash That Killed Boy: Driver Jessica Howe
Was Reaching for a Dropped Cellphone and Speeding in Rear-End Collision, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIB., Apr. 27, 2011, at B 1; Mark Strassman, Suing the Sender? Distracted Driving Lawsuit
Blames Both Texters for Crash, CBS NEWS (May 23, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
505263_1 62-57439808/suing-the-sender-distracted-driving-lawsuit-blames-both-texters-for-crash/.
5 Joan Lowy, Study Shows Increase in Drivers Texting Behind the Wheel, POST-TRIBUNE (Dec. 8,
2011), http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/9328300-418/study-shows-increase-in-drivers-texting-
behind-the-wheel.html; see also infra Part II.B.
6 See Larry Copeland, Campaign Aims to "Stop Texts, Stop Wrecks," USA TODAY, Oct. 28, 2011,
at A3.
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nearly a third of these drivers attributing their insecurity to the phenomenon of
distracted driving.
In December 2011, the National Transportation Safety Board
recommended that all 50 states and the District of Columbia ban texting while
driving. 8 At the federal level, President Obama has issued an executive order
banning federal employees from texting while driving,9 Transportation Secretary
Ray LaHood has convened two national summits on the dangers of distracted
driving,'0 and the Department of Transportation has promulgated regulations that
ban holders of commercial motor vehicle licenses from texting while driving in
interstate commerce." However, there has been pushback from members of
Congress who believe that the issue raises states' rights concerns. In the
semiannual reauthorization process for federal highway support, a proposal that
the federal government fund a $39 million grant program to give states a
financial incentive to ban teens from using any mobile device while driving, as
well as texting by all drivers, has been challenged as an infringement on states'
rights. 12 Georgia Representative Robert Woodall has offered an amendment to
prohibit the Department of Transportation from regulating telecommunications
devices in motor vehicles.
13
Yet beyond the headlines, the data about the dangers of driving while
talking or texting are equivocal. Although there is no doubt that mobile device
use is distracting 4 whether or not the person is wielding a hands-free device, 5
7 ELIZABETH VERMETTE, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY Ass'N, CURBING DISTRACTED DRIVING:
2010 SURVEY OF STATE SAFETY PROGRAMS 6 (2010), available at http://www.ghsa.org/
html/publications/pdf/survey/2010_distraction.pdf.
8 Press Release, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., supra note 2.
9 See Exec. Order No. 13,513, 3 C.F.R. 246 (2010).
10 Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Transp., Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood Announces Second
National Distracted Driving Summit (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.dot.gov/
affairs/2010/dot 14710.html.
11 See Limiting the Use of Wireless Communication Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,118 (Sept. 27, 2010)
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 383-84, 390-92).
12 See Where Your Eyes and Mind Should Be, THE Focus (Feb. 20, 2012), http://blog.focusdriven.
org/tag/government-agencies/.13See H. COMM. ON RULES, 1 12TH CONG., AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT OF H.R. 7 OFFERED
BY MR. WOODALL OF GEORGIA (Comm. Print 2012), available at http://www.
rules.house.gov/amendments/Wooda13213121239403940.pdf.
14 This is true not only of drivers but of walkers and dinner party guests. See David Carr, Keep
Your Thumbs Still When I'm Talking to You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, at STI; Texting While
Walking Banned in New Jersey Town, ABCNEwS (May 13, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/
blogs/headlines/2012/05/texting-while-walking-banned-in-new-jersey-town/.
15 Numerous studies have found that it is the act of being engaged in conversation on a mobile
device, rather than holding the device in one's hand, that is the primary source of distraction, and
thus of potential injury. Crash data support the argument that no safety advantage is conferred by
using a hands-free device, and the availability of hands-free devices may even lead to their greater
use. See Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, The Disconnect Between Law and Policy Analysis:
A Case Study of Drivers and Cell Phones, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 151-66 (2003); David L. Strayer
et al., Cell Phone-Induced Failures of Visual Attention During Simulated Driving, 9 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 23, 31 (2003); see also infra Part II.B.
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mobile devices are far from the only cause of distracted driving. 16  The
exponential increase in mobile device use while driving in the first decade of the
twenty-first century was not matched by a comparable increase in traffic injuries
and fatalities.' 7 Contrary to what one might anticipate in light of media coverage
of distracted driving, American driving fatalities are lower now than at any time
since the 1930s.'8 In an intriguing twist on the deterrent impact of law on motor
vehicle accidents, a recent study found that laws banning texting while driving
did not result in a decrease in accidents, injuries, or fatalities and actually may
have led to a slight increase in these harms. 19 Thus, before pursuing any new
legislative or regulatory action to address the "epidemic" of mobile device use
while driving, it is important to pause and consider what we know-and don't
know-about the causes and effects of distracted driving. In this inquiry it is
essential to be aware of the limits of law's role in shaping behavior. We must
16 Distracted driving has been variously defined and is only one aspect of inattentive driving, which
is also caused by fatigue and other physical and emotional conditions of the driver. NAT'L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DISTRACTED DRIVING 2009 1, 5 (2010), available at
http://www.distraction.gov/research/PDF-Files/Distracted-Driving-2009.pdf.
17 Id. at 2-3 (estimating that the number of people injured in motor vehicle crashes declined from
2,699,000 in 2005 to 2,217,000 in 2009 and noting that the number of fatal crashes declined from
39,252 in 2005 to 30,797 in 2009, with 43,510 fatalities in 2005 and 33,808 fatalities in 2009). On
the other hand, one study has calculated that the increased use of cell phones from 1980 to 2004
does correlate with increasing traffic fatality rates. See Richard Fowles et al, The Cell Phone Effect
on Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatality Rates: A Bayesian and Classical Econometric Evaluation, 46
TRANSp. RES. PART E: LOGISTICS & TRANSP. REV. 1140, 1142, 1145 (2010). NHTSA data also
suggest that distraction-related crashes are accounting for a greater proportion of traffic accidents
and fatalities. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 16, at 2-4. However,
because there is no uniform definition of distracted driving and because local law enforcement
officials differ in their criteria for identifying accidents caused by distracted driving, estimates of
the number of accidents, injuries, and fatalities caused by distracted driving vary widely. Id. at 6
(noting that state reports of the percentage of accidents caused by distracted driving in 2009 ranged
from 0 percent to 50 percent); NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., AN EXAMINATION OF
DRIVER DISTRACTION As RECORDED IN NHTSA DATABASES 2 (2009), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811216.pdf (finding that estimates of the proportion of distraction-related
accidents vary from 1 to 70 percent). This span is so broad as to be meaningless.
18 U.S. motor vehicle fatalities increased at a generally steady rate from 1899 to 1972, with slight
dips during the Great Depression and World War II. In 1972 the highest motor vehicle fatality
toll-54,589 people killed-was reached. In 2009, an estimated 33,963 people were killed in
motor vehicle accidents. ANDERS LONGTHORNE ET AL., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES IN 2008 12
(2010), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811346.pdf. The fatality rate per one
hundred million vehicle miles traveled has decreased steadily since it was first recorded in the early
1920s. Id. at4, 12.
'9 HIGHWAY Loss DATA INST., HIGHWAY Loss DATA INSTITUTE BULLETIN: TEXTING LAWS AND
COLLISION CLAIM FREQUENCIES 8 (2010), available at http://www.iihs.org/research/
topics/pdf/HLDI Bulletin 27 11 .pdf. The authors of the report speculate that when drivers are
aware of the ban on texting that they may try to hide their activity, perhaps holding their cell
phones in their laps, and thus spend more time with their eyes away from the road, leading to more
accidents. Id.
2012]
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carefully examine the empirical data2° about the relationship between mobile
device use, traffic accidents, and traffic fatalities2' and thoughtfully review the
extensive literature on deterrence in action, including studies exploring how the
law can affect motor vehicle drivers. Most importantly, we must recognize that
Americans have a love affair with both their cars and their technology.22 As a
result, changing the behavior of drivers to decrease technology-related accidents
will require interventions that are both sophisticated and subtle.
A ROAD MAP
Part I of this article explores what we know about the risks of mobile
device use while driving, examining a wide range of studies, including simulated
driving experiences, close monitoring of drivers in real time over long periods,
short-term observational studies, and other psychological evidence. Part II
reviews the reactions of government and private actors to distracted driving, both
historically and in recent years. This part situates today's problem of distracted
driving in the broader context of motor vehicle safety, examining the responses
of the auto and insurance industries as well as federal, state, and local lawmakers
to the broad array of factors that affect driving risk. This part pays particular
attention to teenage drivers, using what we know about youthful brain
development and general maturity to suggest successful strategies for dissuading
young drivers from talking and texting while driving. Part III compares the legal
system's answer to the problem of driving while using a mobile device with the
legal response to drunk driving, laws mandating the use of seat belts and child
20 Indeed, identifying a causal connection between cell phone use and traffic accidents is
particularly difficult because many states use different criteria for collecting information about
traffic accidents and crashes. VERMETrE, supra note 7, at 8 (noting that "only thirty-four states
collect specific information on cell phone use when driving that meet Model Minimum Uniform
Crash Criteria"). Many accident reports do not include information on distracting events.
HIGHWAY Loss DATA INST., supra note 19, at 9. Further, many drivers may be hesitant to admit
that they used a cell phone in close proximity to a crash. THOMAS A. RANNEY, NAT'L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DRIVER DISTRACTION: A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE
4 (2008), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/12073978/Driver-Distraction-A-Review-of-the-
Current-StateofKnowledge; see also NAT'L TRAFFIC SAFETY ADM1N., supra note 18, at 2.
21 When cell phones first came into wide use they may have actually yielded a safety dividend
because motorists could call for help immediately after an accident and ensure that victims received
prompt medical attention during the so-called "golden hour," thereby increasing chances of
surviving the accident. Fowles et al., supra note 18, at 1141, 1145. However, a recent study
examining traffic fatality rates in the United States from 1980 to 2004 found that, while cell phone
use may initially have had a net life-saving effect, this benefit has been lost due to the overall
increased risk of accident attributable to the large number of cell phone users. Id. at 1140, 1141-
42, 1145-46.
22 This observation parallels that of H. Laurence Ross, who observed that Americans are highly
committed both to the automobile and to drinking alcohol. H. LAURENCE Ross, CONFRONTING
DRUNK DRIVING: SOCIAL POLICY FOR SAVING LIVES 23-35 (1992). Accordingly, without a candid
recognition of these dual strong attachments, efforts to change the law to try to reduce the harms
caused by driving under the influence of alcohol are unlikely to succeed. Id. at 172-73, 181-85.
[Vol. 8 1:1
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safety seats, and laws requiring motorcyclists to wear a helmet. This part draws
on the extensive literature on deterrence in general and studies of motor vehicle
law enforcement issues in particular. In Part IV, the article recommends
effective ways to reduce the harm caused by the use of cell phones while driving,
including changes in criminal and tort law, tailored law enforcement strategies,
and innovations in communication and transportation technology to minimize the
dangers of distracted driving.
I. THE RISKS OF MOBILE DEVICE USE WHILE DRIVING
A. Mobile Device Use is Exploding
Over the last twenty-five years, Americans' mobile device use has grown
exponentially. While there were only 204,000 cell phone subscribers in 1985, by
2010 there were nearly 293 million subscribers, 23 or almost one cell phone for
every American.24  In the last five years, cell phone usage has expanded
dramatically as cell phone providers have competed for subscribers by offering
unlimited calling on nights and weekends and other incentives to increase usage.
Americans used 1.26 quadrillion (1,260,000 billion) minutes in June 2005; this
figure rose to 2.257 quadrillion (2,257,000 billion) minutes in June 2010.25 In
2005, there were only fifty-seven billion text messages sent; by 2010 the number
of text messages rose to 1.8 trillion (1,806 billion).26 Drivers' use of mobile
devices has paralleled the dramatic increase in mobile device use overall.27 Since
2004 observational studies have found that between five and six percent of
drivers are using hand-held devices at any given time, although one percent or
less are visibly manipulating the devices. 28 One telephone survey found that
forty percent of drivers acknowledged talking on the phone while driving at least
a few times a week.29 Drivers between sixteen and twenty-four are more than
twice as likely as other drivers to be visibly manipulating hand-held devices, 30
perhaps because for them, mobile devices have long been accepted as part of
normal life. Teen drivers are especially likely to use mobile devices and to text
23 CTIA-THE WIRELESS Ass'N, SEMI-ANNUAL WIRELESS INDUSTRY SURVEY 5 (2010), available at
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIASurveyMidyear20OOGraphics.pdf. There were 203,600 cell
phone subscribers in June 1985 and 292,847,098 cell phone subscribers in June 2010. Id.
24 There were 308,745,538 Americans in April 2010, according to data from the 2010 census. 2010
Census Data, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010, http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data (last visited
July 7, 2012).
25 CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASS'N, supra note 23, at 7.
26 Id.
27 See Fowles et al., supra note 17.
28 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DRIVER ELECTRONIC DEVICE USE IN 2009 1 (2010),
available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811372.pdf.29 Keli A. Braitman & Anne T. McCartt, National Reported Patterns of Driver Cell Phone Use in
the United States, 11 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 543, 544 (2010).30 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 28, at 2.
2012]
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while driving. 31 A 2009 telephone survey found that forty-three percent of teens
acknowledged talking on a mobile device while driving and twenty-six percent of
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old drivers admitted to texting while driving. 32 A
2010 study found that sixty-four percent of teen drivers admitted that they had
talked on a mobile device while driving, with twenty-six percent stating that they
sometimes used these devices to take pictures while driving and fifteen percent
admitting that they had changed their Facebook or MySpace profiles while
driving.33
B. Why Using a Mobile Device Is Distracting
Distracted driving comes in many forms. In addition to using a cell
phone to converse, text, or connect to the Internet, drivers are distracted by
talking to passengers, attending to pets in the car, rubbernecking, looking at
billboards and other road signage, listening to or adjusting a radio or CD player,
using a GPS device, eating, drinking, and smoking, as well as applying make-up
or shaving.34 Talking or listening to a cell phone while driving slightly elevates
the risk of a crash or "near crash" event, while dialing and answering a phone
increases it more.35 Using a cell phone while driving can lead to visual,
31 Braitman & McCartt, supra note 29, at 546 (finding that forty-three percent of teens reported
some texting while driving, the highest percentage among all age groups).
32 MARY MADDEN & AMANDA LENHART, PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS AND DISTRACTED DRIVING:
TEXTING, TALKING AND OTHER USES OF THE CELL PHONE BEHIND THE WHEEL 4 (2009), available at
http://pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIPTeens-andDistractedDriving.pdf.
33 Brian Mitchell, Cell Phones Distracting Teen Drivers, ECOUSTICS.COM (May 4, 2010),
http://forum.ecoustics.com/bbs/messages/34579/631987.html (describing a study conducted by
Liberty Mutual Insurance and SADD (Students Against Destructive Decisions)); see also Larry
Copeland, Technology Tackles Teen Drivers' Phone Distractions, USATODAY.COM (Jan. 17, 2012,
1:26 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/wireless/story/2012-01-13/distracted-driving-cell-
control-app/52603546/1.34See SHEILA G. KLAUER ET AL., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., AN ANALYSIS OF
DRIVER INATTENTION USING A CASE-CROSSOVER APPROACH ON 100-CAR DATA: FINAL REPORT vi
(2010), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/Research/Human+Factors/ci.Distraction.print; NAT'L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 16, at 4-5; RANNEY, supra note 20, at 1, 17;
HELMUT SCHNEIDER, ANALYSIS OF HAND-HELD VERSUS HANDS-FREE CELL PHONE USE WHILE
DRIVING 5 (2010), available at http://lahighwaysafety.org/pdf/Report%20on%20cell%20phone
%20use%20while%20driving-FINAL.pdf
35 A recent study using interior cameras found that in real-life driving drivers of cars and light
vehicles talking or listening to a cell phone were 1.3 times as likely to have a crash or near-crash as
drivers who were not driving in a distracted manner; the same study found that truck drivers were
no more likely to have a crash while talking or listening on a cell phone. New Data from Virginia
Tech Transportation Institute Provides Insight into Cell Phone Use and Driving Distraction, VA.
TECH NEWS (July 29, 2009), http://www.vtnews.vt.edu/articles/2009/07/2009-57 1.html [hereinafter
New Data from VTT1]. Reaching for an object, including a cell phone, can increase the risk,
although the data here show that the increase for drivers of cars is small (only 1.4 times the risk of
non-distracted driving, compared to a 6.7 time risk for truck drivers). Id. Dialing a phone
increases the risk for drivers of cars to 2.8 times, while for truck drivers the risk was 5.9 times the
risk of non-distracted driving. Id.
[Vol. 81:1
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cognitive, auditory, and biomechanical distraction.36 It appears that visual
distraction creates the biggest risks, because it involves drivers taking their eyes
off the road.37 Failing to keep one's eyes on the road can lead to unintended lane
changes as well as failing to observe road signs and potential hazards, including
nearby vehicles.38 Texting greatly increases the risk of visual distraction; 39 thus,
a 2009 study found that when drivers of commercial vehicles text they are 23.2
times more likely than non-texting drivers to have a crash or "near crash.
' 40
Cognitive distraction occurs because humans appear to have limited attentional
capacity; hence, when the brain is involved in listening it is less able to process
visual stimuli.4' Talking on a mobile device can lead to drivers "look[ing] but..
. not see[ing]"4--which is particularly hazardous at intersections-as well as
reacting more slowly and failing to maintain a proper distance and appropriate
36 See RANNEY, supra note 20, at 2 (discussing cognitive distraction); Shannon L. Noder, Note,
Talking and Texting While Driving: A Look at Regulating Cell Phone Use Behind the Wheel, 44
VAL. U. L. REV. 237, 244 (2009). There is an ongoing debate about the extent to which simulated
studies of distracting driving can be generalized to driving under real-world conditions, with some
researchers arguing that laboratory experiments, no matter how well designed, cannot predict actual
driving behavior. See RANNEY, supra note 20, at 4-8; New Data from VTTI, supra note 35, at 2-3.
In this view, the experiments are best at measuring the relative distraction risk of certain tasks but
cannot identify what drivers will actually do in practice. RANNEY, supra note 20, at 5. Others who
have reached this conclusion reason that because "bad" simulated driving has no actual
consequences, the "drivers" may be less careful than if they were on a real road; and second, that in
the real world, drivers will choose not to text or use their mobile devices if they face heavy traffic
or other hazardous conditions. See Anne T. McCartt et al., Cell Phones and Driving: Review of
Research, 7 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 89, 92 (2006). Further, simulator research ignores the
impact of practice on tasks associated with cell phone use and driving; drivers, particularly young
ones, can learn to perform better. Id. at 94.
37 See Ashlee Vance & Matt Richtel, Despite Risks, Internet Creeps Onto Dashboard, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2010, at Al (discussing trend of auto manufacturers offering more Internet-connected
technology as standard issue in new cars, despite the risk of accidents due to driver distraction).
38 See Frank A. Drews et al., Text Messaging During Simulated Driving, 51 HUMAN FACTORS: J.
HUMAN FACTORS & ERGONOMIC SOC'Y 762, 763-69 (2009), available at http://hfs.sagepub.conl
content/51/5/762.full.pdf?keytype=ref&siteid=sphfs&ijkey=gRQOLrGIYnBfc (reviewing literature
on impact of cell phone use and describing a study of drivers aged nineteen to twenty-three texting
while "driving" a simulator).
39 Jessica S. Hafetz et al., Adolescent Drivers'Perceptions of the Advantages and Disadvantages of
Abstention from In-Vehicle Cell Phone Use, 42 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 1570, 1570
(2010).40 JEFFREY S. HICKMAN ET AL., FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., DISTRACTION IN COMMERCIAL
TRUCKS AND BUSES: ASSESSING PREVALENCE AND RISK IN CONJUNCTION WITH CRASHES AND NEAR-
CRASHES xiv (2010), available at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/research-technology/
report!Distraction-in-Commercial-Trucks-and-Buses-report.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of Transp., U.S. Transportation Secretary LaHood Announces Final Rule That Bans Hand-Held
Cell Phone Use by Drivers of Buses and Large Trucks (Nov. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/about/news/news-releases/201 1/Secretary-LaHood-Announces-Step-
towards-Safer-Highways.aspx.
41 Marcel A. Just et al., A Decrease in Brain Activation Associated with Driving When Listening to
Someone Speak, 1205 BRAIN RES. 70, 71-72 (2008); McCartt et al., supra note 36, at 96.
42 RANNEY, supra note 20, at 11.
2012]
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speed.43  In contrast, when drivers are talking to a person in the vehicle-a
passenger-they are less likely to be distracted.44 Empirical data suggest that this
may be because passengers, in contrast to distant conversationalists, are more
readily able to recognize heavy or hazardous traffic and refrain from talking.45
This is not the case, however, with teenage drivers, who appear to be more
distractible and more likely to engage in risky behavior when they have friends in
the car.46 Due to the cognitive and auditory distraction involved in telephone
conversations, hands-free cell phone use has not been shown to be significantly
less distracting, and therefore less risky, than using a hand-held cell phone,
although dialing and answering the phone are easier with hands-free devices.47
Hands-free devices are most likely to reduce the risk of biomechanical distraction
that arises from attempting to drive with one hand while talking or texting. 4
The data are mixed about whether driving while using a cell phone is
comparable to driving while under the influence of alcohol. Two early studies of
simulated driving comparing drivers using cell phones with those with a blood
alcohol level just at the legal limit of .08 percent found that those who used cell
phones were less attentive, had slower reaction times, and experienced more
simulated rear-end collisions.49 In contrast, a recent naturalistic driving study
concluded that talking on a cell phone while driving is much less risky than
driving under the influence of alcohol, which elevates the risk of a fatal car crash
to seven times the risk of a fatal crash from sober driving. 50 However, several
commentators have suggested that simulator studies of phone and alcohol use do
not reflect real world risks, since the effects of alcohol impairment last through
an entire road trip, compared to the relatively short duration of most cell phone
431Id. at6, 14.
4 Just et al., supra note 41, at 77; Fernando A. Wilson & Jim P. Stimpson, Trends in Fatalities
from Distracted Driving in the United States, 1999 to 2008, 100 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 2213, 2217
(2010); Gilbert Cruz & Kristi Oloffson, Distracted Driving: Should Talking, Texting Be Banned?,
TIME, Aug. 24, 2009, at 45.
45 Cruz & Oloffson, supra note 44, at 45.
46 Wilson & Stimpson, supra note 44, at 2217. This is one reason why graduated license programs,
which limit the circumstances under which newly licensed teenage drivers can drive, including the
number of teenage passengers they may carry, have proven successful in reducing fatal accidents
among teens. Anne T. McCartt et al., Graduated Licensing Laws and Fatal Crashes of Teenage
Drivers: A National Study, 11 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 240, 240, 246 (2010) (noting that in 2007
sixty-one percent of teenage passengers who died in motor vehicle accidents were in cars driven by
another teen, and finding that in states with graduated license laws that prohibited teens from
driving with other teen passengers there were twenty-one percent fewer fatal crashes than in states
whose laws did not restrict teen passengers).
47 HICKMAN ET AL., supra note 40, at xiii-xiv; McCartt et al., supra note 36, at 92-95; see also infra
Part l.B.
48 See Erin Barmby, Chapter 290: California's Message to Hang Up and Pay Attention, 38
MCGEORGE L. REV. 342, 346-47 (2007).
49 MCartt et al., supra note 36, at 95.50New Data from VTTI, supra note 35.
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calls, and many impaired drivers are intoxicated at levels well above the legal
limit.5
C. Accident and Injury Data
Both anecdotal evidence and rigorous studies suggest that cell phone use
is related to accidents.52 Most drivers, with the possible exception of teenagers,
53
recognize that they are less attentive when using their cell phones. At the same
time, the data clearly show that the geometric expansion of cell phone use while
driving since the 1980s has not been matched by a comparable increase in motor
vehicle accidents, deaths, or injuries.54 Indeed, while cell phone usage has
increased steadily since 1999, the number of fatalities associated with distracted
driving has fluctuated significantly during that time, although it has increased
markedly since 2005, 5 the year when texting really took off.56 In 2009, the most
recent year for which national data is available, there were 30,797 fatal motor
vehicle accidents in the United States, which killed 33,808 people. 7 Eleven
percent of these crashes involved a distracted driver.58 However, of these
crashes, only eighteen percent involved cell phone use.59 Thus, less than three
percent of all accidental traffic fatalities involved a driver who was using a cell
phone. Similarly, of the 2,217,000 people injured in motor vehicle accidents in
2009, an estimated 448,000, or twenty percent, were injured in a crash involving
distracted driving; however, only about five percent of these accidents were
attributable to cell phone use.60
Drivers under age twenty were the age group most likely to have fatal
accidents attributed to distracted driving.6I This is consistent with the higher
accident rate of young drivers generally 62 and is, in turn, attributable to both their
51 See MCartt et al., supra note 36, at 101.
52 See supra notes 2-5; supra Part II.B; infra notes 53-69.
53 See supra notes 31-36. But see Alex Stone, California Drivers Ignore Hands-Free Law,
ABCNEwS (Nov. 2, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/AheadoftheCurve/california-
drivers-ignore-hands-free-cell-phone-law/story?id=897482 1#.Tj9kY4mwO4 (recounting
California Highway Patrol officer's description of drivers' excuse for violating the law: "They say,
'I've used my cell phone dozens of times, and I've never been involved in a wreck."').
54 See supra note 17.
55 Wilson & Stimpson, supra note 44, at 2215 fig. 1.
56 Id. at 2216; see also CTIA-THE WIRELESS Ass'N, supra note 23, at 7.
57 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 16, at 1.
581d. at 1-2.
59 Id. at 1.
60 Id. at 1, 3. Additionally, approximately sixteen percent of accidents that resulted only in property
damage were found to involve distracted driving, but there was no further breakdown for cell phone
use. Id. at 3.
61 See VERMETTE, supra note 7, at 10, 22.
62 Id. at 22 (noting that "[t]een drivers (between 16 and 19) are involved in fatal crashes at four
times the rate of adult drivers (25 to 69), per mile driven.").
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youth and lack of experience behind the wheel. 63 While it is difficult to tease out
whether it is youth or lack of driving experience that has the greatest influence on
accident rates, at least one study's authors speculated that young drivers may not
recognize the riskiness of certain driving behaviors,64 such as looking away from
the road, reaching for dropped objects, and speeding and other types of impatient
behavior.65 Yet, among all distracted drivers involved in fatal accidents, those in
their thirties were the most likely to have cell phone use as the cause of their
distraction.66 This is perhaps not surprising since people in this age group are the
original multi-taskers, and thus likely to be using their cell phone not only for
work-related phone calls but also for staying in touch with their children and
other family members.
What is not clear is whether the lack of increased crashes and traffic
fatalities attributable to cell phone use is evidence that cell phones are not, in
fact, that risky, or whether the long-term national trend of decreasing fatalities
from traffic accidents 67 is masking the true risks of cell phone use while driving.
This long-term trend has been attributed to a variety of other factors, including
increased use of seat belts and a lower incidence of driving under the influence of
alcohol or other drugs, which in turn are due to stepped-up law enforcement
efforts.68 A recent study of the impact of texting bans, which showed a slight
increase in insurance claims for motor vehicle collisions after these laws were
adopted, suggests that teasing out the question of causation is complex indeed.69
63 See Anne T. McCartt et al., Effects ofAge and Experience on Young Driver Crashes: Review of
Recent Literature, 10 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 209, 214 (2009).
64 Id. at 214-15; see also VERMETTE, supra note 7, at 22.
65 See supra notes 2-5 (discussing driving behaviors leading to fatal car crashes).66 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 16, at 2-3.
67 From 1994 to 2009, the number of fatal motor vehicle crashes declined from 36,254 to 30,797;
additionally, traffic fatalities showed a significant decline during this period, whether measured as
the number of deaths per 100 million miles driven (1.73 to 1.14), number per 100,000 population
(15.64 to 11.01), or the number per 100,000 licensed drivers (23.21 to 16.13). Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS) Encyclopedia, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://www-
fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx (last visited July 8, 2012). To put this in broader perspective,
"[t]he occupant fatality rate (including motorcyclists) per 100,000 population, which declined by
22.7 percent from 1975 to 1992, decreased by 26.8 percent from 1992 to 2009." Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS) Encyclopedia Did You Know Archive, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/DidYouKnow.aspx (follow "Trends" hyperlink) (last
visited July 8, 2012).
68 See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2009 DATA: ALCOHOL-
IMPAIRED DRIVING 1-2 (2009), available at www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/ncsa/pdf/2010/811385.pdf
("The alcohol-impaired-driving fatality rate in the past 10 years has declined by 27 percent from
0.49 in 2000 to 0.36 in 2009."); NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS:
SEAT BELT USE IN 201 1-OVERALL RESULTS 1 (2011), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811544.pdf (estimating that seat belt use has increased nationwide from
fifty-eight percent in 1994 to eighty-four percent in 2011); Noder, supra note 36, at 250; see also
infra Part III.B-III.C (discussing deterrent effect of drunk driving and seat belt laws).
69 HIGHWAY LOSS DATA INST., supra note 19, at 5-6, 9.
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II. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO DRIVING WHILE TEXTING
OR TALKING
A. Responses to Distracted Driving
Complaints about distracted driving are nearly as old as the automobile
itself.70 The introduction of window wipers in the early 1900s was first
accompanied by fears that they might induce a hypnotic state in drivers.71 The
first law directed at distracted driving was proposed in 1930 when legislators in
Massachusetts sought to prohibit drivers from listening to the car radio.72 Many
states sought to address the problem of distracted driving by including it within
the broader prohibition on reckless driving, leaving it to the discretion of an
arresting officer (and ultimately a district attorney) as to whether particular
conduct should be sanctioned by the payment of a fine or the initiation of
criminal charges.73
B. Laws Banning Mobile Device Use While Driving
Since cell phone use while driving has become a matter of public
concern, a wide range of laws have been enacted to try to reduce their use among
drivers.74 Paralleling the debate about gun control, the political, if not empirical,
question is whether a certain technology (firearms or cell phones) is so risky that
its use should be prohibited or regulated or whether the problem is created by a
relatively small number of individuals who choose to use the technology in a
dangerous manner. While no state absolutely bans the use of cell phones by
drivers, 75 ten states and the District of Columbia prohibit the use of hand-held
cell phones and thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia prohibit texting
70 One can speculate that the first efforts to curb distracted driving were a response to the very high
automobile fatality and injury rates of the early twentieth century, which were particularly high for
young, urban children, who had no place other than the streets to play. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER,
PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 23, 32-43 (1994). In
reaction to the large financial losses suffered by life insurance and casualty insurance companies to
compensate bereaved parents, a national safety campaign began, which focused primarily on
educating children about the dangers of playing in and near the streets, as opposed to educating
drivers to engage in safer, less risky driving. Id. at 36-52.
71 VERMETTE, supra note 7, at 6.
72 Paul K. Hentzen, Comment, The Trouble with Telematics: The Uneasy Marriage of Wireless
Technology and Automobiles, 69 UMKC L. REv. 845, 859-60 (2001).
73 Today all states have laws prohibiting reckless driving. See Reckless Driving: State Laws,
FINDLAW, http://public.findlaw.com/traffic-ticket-violation-law/traffic-ticket-a-z/reckless-driving-
laws.html (last visited July 6, 2011).
74 See generally Cell Phone and Texting Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS'N (July 2012),
http://www.ghsa.org/htm/stateinfo/laws/cellphonelaws.html.
75 See id.; see also Ashley Halsey III, State Officials Put Aside Total Ban on Drivers' Use of
Cellphones, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2010, at A3.
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while driving. 76 Federal, state, and local governments 77 have also promulgated
bans on texting and/or hand-held cell phone use by certain categories of drivers,
particularly teenage drivers or other recently-licensed drivers,78 school bus
drivers,7 9 and other commercial motor vehicle drivers.
80
The cell phone industry is opposed to bans on cell phone use, arguing,
for example, that bans on hand-held verses hands-free devices discriminate
against people who cannot afford to purchase a new device or that these bans do
not get at the real problem of distracted driving.81 At the same time, cell phone
and automobile manufacturers have joined forces to promote a wide array of
Internet-connected and otherwise distracting devices either as standard
equipment in new automobiles or as add-ons.82 BMW and other automakers are
promoting technology that presents information to drivers in "brief bursts" on
"heads-up displays," and General Motors is marketing its Chevy Cruze to young
drivers by touting its Facebook-update feature, which is made available via the
car's voice-activated Onstar system.83 One industry analyst speculates that the
number of vehicles with "info-tainment systems" could more than triple to sixty
million worldwide by 2017.84 A consortium of automakers, information systems
suppliers, and device manufacturers has been formed to work together on
expanding the potential for drivers to integrate their portable mobile devices into
their driving experience, as they forecast that vehicles will "evolv[e] ... to be a
'living space. '  Because mobile communications technology is developing
76 Cell Phone and Texting Laws, supra note 74. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia as well as the District of
Columbia and the Virgin Islands ban all drivers from using a handheld cell phone while driving.
Id. Thirty-nine states (Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), the District of
Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands prohibit all drivers from text messaging. Id; see also
State Laws, DISTRACTION.GOv, http://www.distraction.gov/content/get-the-facts/state-laws.html
(last visited May 26, 2011).
77 Some localities have adopted cell phone or texting bans. Sometimes these have been precursors
to a state-wide ban, but in other states the law specifically preempts localities from adopting such
bans. Cell Phone and Texting Laws, supra note 74.
78 Thirty-two states ban novice drivers from any cell phone use while driving, and five states that
allow most drivers to text prohibit novice drivers from texting. Id.
79 Nineteen states and the District of Columbia prohibit school bus drivers from using a cell phone
when a passenger is present; three states ban school bus drivers from texting. Id.
80 Under U.S. Department of Transportation regulations, all holders of commercial motor vehicle
licenses are banned from texting while driving in interstate commerce. 49 C.F.R. § 392.80 (2012).
81 Barmby, supra note 48, at 349-50.
82 Vance & Richtel, supra note 37.
83 Joseph B. White, U.S. Presses to Rein in Web Gadgets in New Cars, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2011,
at DI.
84 Id.
85 Nokia-New Car Connectivity Consortium Aims to Put In- Vehicle Infotainment into High Gear,
ENP NEWSWIRE, Mar. 17, 2011.
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much faster than consumers can upgrade their cars,86 many device manufacturers
are offering new products to surmount this technological hurdle, such as the
"GoSmart" clip, which permits drivers to mount their phones directly to the
steering wheel.87
An increasing number of studies show that there is no safety-based
justification for treating hand-held cell phones differently than hands-free
devices. 8 Studies of simulated driving as well as "naturalistic" studies of actual
driving show that there is no difference in the risk of a crash or near crash in the
use of a hand-held or hands-free device.89 When driving and using a cell phone,
the most dangerous actions are the acts of dialing and reaching for a cell phone,
headset, or earpiece9° because they involve extended periods in which drivers
take their eyes off the road. 91 At the same time, studies show that during cell
phone conversations most drivers focus primarily on the road ahead and do less
peripheral- and mirror-checking of their environment, making it more likely that
they will be unaware of road hazards.92 Indeed, a potential unintended
consequence of laws that ban the use of hand-held cell phones while permitting
hands-free devices is that people will conclude that hands-free devices are safer
and therefore use them more frequently and for a longer duration than they would
if they were holding a cell phone to their ear.93
Several recent studies also raise questions about the efficacy of bans on
cell phone use. Although some studies have found that bans on the use of hand-
86 See id.
87 See Roy Furchgott, The GoSmart Clip: A Well-Made Bad Idea, GADGETWISE (Apr. 7, 2011, 2:17
PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/the-gosmart-clip-a-well-made-bad-idea/.
88 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 34, at 6.
89 See WILLIAM J. HORREY & CHRISTOPHER D. WICKENS, THE IMPACT OF CELL PHONE
CONVERSATIONS ON DRIVING: A META-ANALYTiC APPROACH 1 (Mar. 2004) (prepared under
contract for General Motors Company) (describing a meta-analysis of sixteen studies of the impact
of cell phone conversation only on driver performance, which showed that the act of conversation
was distracting and slowed drivers' reaction time); SCHNEIDER, supra note 34, at 6 (summarizing
data); Hahn & Dudley, supra note 15, at 151-67, (summarizing data); New Data from VTT1, supra
note 35 (naturalistic driving study found that "[h]eadset cell phone use is not substantially safer
than hand-held use because the primary risk associated with both tasks is answering, dialing, and
other tasks that require your eyes to be off the road.").
90 HICKMAN ET AL., supra note 40, at ix, xii-xv (describing study via videotape of drivers of
commercial trucks and buses and comparing it to simulator studies). The data is equivocal about
whether hands-free dialing is safer than hand-held dialing. Anne T. McCartt et al., Long-Term
Effects of Handheld Cell Phone Laws on Driver Handheld Cell Phone Use, 11 TRAFFIC INJ.
PREVENTION 133, 134 (2010).
91 See KLAUER ET AL., supra note 34, at 57 (finding that study "confirmed the riskiness of looking
away from the forward roadway, even for fairly brief periods of time or for repeated brief glances
away from the forward roadway .... Thus, tasks with intermittent, repeated glances away from the
forward roadway (e.g., text messaging or dialing a cell phone) are riskier than those tasks that
require less time and fewer eyeglances away from the forward roadway (e.g., inserting a CD,
talking on the cell phone).").
92 Id. at 58-59.
93 See Hahn & Dudley, supra note 15, at 166-67.
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held cell phones lead to lessened use, these decreases appear to depend on high-
cost/high-publicity enforcement and have shown a tendency to stabilize over
time.94 However, in states where there has been consistent public attention given
to cell phone bans, there has been an overall decrease in cell phone use. 95
However, it is less clear whether decreased cell phone use while driving will
94 McCartt et al., supra note 90, at 134. The study found that before the District of Columbia
adopted a ban on hand-held cell phones in 2004, 6.1 percent of all drivers were observed using their
cell phone while driving. Id. While that number fell to 3.5 percent immediately after the ban, it
rose gradually to 4.2 percent by April 2009. Id. However, the post-ban D.C. rates were
consistently lower than those of drivers in neighboring Maryland and Virginia, leading the study's
authors to speculate that absent the ban the observed rate in D.C. would have been forty-three
percent higher. Id. at 134, 136-37. Similar but less dramatic results appeared in a study by the
same authors of New York state's ban on hand-held cell phones enacted in 2001. Before the ban
2.3 percent of drivers were observed using such phones; this number fell to 1.1 percent
immediately after the ban went into effect. Id. However, in March 2003 the number of hand-held
using drivers rebounded to 2.1 percent, and in April 2009 that number had risen to 3.9 percent, a
rate greater than the 2.1 percent observed rate of drivers in neighboring Connecticut, which did not
adopt a ban on hand held cell phone use until 2005. Id. The authors estimated that had there been
no ban, New York drivers' use of hand held phones would have been about 24 percent higher. Id.
at 134,136-37, 139.
In the United Kingdom, a preliminary study showed that a ban had a short-term effect on cell phone
use, but provided no data on the ban's impact on accident rates. Sandeep Johal et al., Mobile
Phones and Driving, 27 J. PUB. HEALTH 112 (2005), available at
http://jpubhealth.oxfordjoumals.org (showing a reduction from 1.85 percent of drivers using hand-
held phones to .97 percent in the first ten weeks after the ban became effective). However, many
drivers continued to violate the ban and fatalities and serious injuries attributable to cell phone use
increased. See Mobiles Lead to Rise in Road Casualties, BUCKS FREE PRESS (U.K.), July 5, 2007.
In response, in 2007 Parliament enacted a law that doubled the fine for using a cell phone while
driving from £30 to £60, added three points to drivers' licenses for a violation, and made the crime
of causing a fatal accident while using a cell phone punishable by up to fourteen years in prison.
David Williams, Despite Risk of Jail, Motorists Flout Ban on Mobiles, EVENING STANDARD (U.K.),
July 16, 2008. A 2010 study of London drivers found that although the rates of cell phone use
while driving dipped initially in response to the 2007 law change, by 2009 rates had risen
dramatically, more than doubling for every category of driver. S. NARINE ET AL., MOBILE PHONE
AND SEAT BELT USAGE RATES 1N LONDON 2009 24, 28 (2010).
95 Recent enhanced and highly publicized law enforcement efforts in Connecticut and New York
have achieved at least short-term reductions in hand-held cell phone use in selected cities compared
to "control" cities, although the decreases were statistically significant only among drivers twenty-
five and older. LINDA COSGROVE ET AL., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., HIGH
VISIBILITY ENFORCEMENT DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS IN CONNECTICUT AND NEW YORK REDUCE
HAND-HELD PHONE USE 4-5 (2011) [hereinafter COSGROVE ET AL., HIGH VISIBILITY ENFORCEMENT
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS], available at http://www.distraction.gov/download/research-
pdf/High-Visibility-Enforcement-Demo.pdf. In a follow-up study, further waves of highly
publicized enforcement of the cell phone ban were shown to decrease cell phone use. LINDA
COSGROVE ET AL., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FOUR HIGH VISIBILITY ENFORCEMENT
DEMONSTRATION WAVES IN CONNECTICUT AND NEW YORK REDUCE HAND-HELD PHONE USE 5, 10,
12 (2011) [hereinafter COSGROVE ET AL., FOUR HIGH VISIBILITY ENFORCEMENT DEMONSTRATION
WAVES], available at http://www.distraction.gov/download/research-pdf/508-research-note-dot-hs-
811-845.pdf. Overall cell phone use in the control cities in the two states also declined, although at
more modest rates, suggesting that "social norms towards phone use and texting while driving may
be shifting, becoming less acceptable behaviors to the public." Id. at 10.
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necessarily translate into a decreased incidence of traffic accidents and
concomitant injuries and death.
There are at least four reasons for this. One is that while the observed
percentage of drivers using cell phones appears to have gone down, more and
more drivers are using cell phones at least sometimes when they drive.96 This is
particularly so among younger drivers.97 Second, at the same time, the overall
motor vehicle accident rate, including accidents which lead to fatalities, has been
steadily decreasing over the last seventeen years, despite the exponential increase
in the use of cell phones and texting;98 it is thus impossible to infer a cause and
effect relationship between bans that cause a decrease in observed cell phone use
and fewer motor vehicle accidents. 99 Third, legal obstacles to obtaining cell
phone records in the United States have so far made it impossible to directly
connect individual drivers' cell phone use with their involvement in a motor
vehicle accident.'00 Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, when the question
tested by the study is not observed cell phone use but actual accidents, the data
suggest a counter-intuitive result. Two recent studies appear to show that even
when states have enacted bans on drivers' use of hand-held cell phones or texting
while driving, there is no greater decrease in the rate of vehicle collisions in
states with such bans than in neighboring "control" states that have not enacted a
similar ban. A 2009 study employing this methodology found that cell phone
bans in California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and New York were
not associated with a decrease in the numbers of collision claims (and thus
96 See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
97 McCartt et al., supra note 90, at 138.
98 Alexander G. Nikolaev et al., Evaluating the Impact of Legislation Prohibiting Hand-Held Cell
Phone Use While Driving, 44 TRANsP. RES. PART A: POL'Y & PRAC. 182, 190-91 (2010)
(summarizing accident rates from 1994-2004); Wilson & Stimpson, supra note 44, at 2215-17
(summarizing accident fatalities attributable to distraction from 1999-2008).
99 Thus, although Nikolaev et al. acknowledged that cell phone use had increased dramatically even
as motor vehicle accident rates were slowly declining, they relied on accident data from New York
state counties to assert that because accidents had gradually declined after the 2001 ban this showed
that the ban on cell phone use was the cause of the decline. Nikolaev et al, supra note 98, at 184,
190. This research has been criticized on the ground that it is impossible to separately identify a
decrease in accidents attributable to the cell phone ban when there is a continuing downward trend
in accidents attributable to other previously existing factors. See Breno Sampaio, On the
Identification of the Effect of Prohibiting Hand-Held Cell Phone Use While Driving: Comment, 44
TRANSP. RES. PART A: POL'Y & PRAC, 766, 767 (2010).
100 McCartt et al., supra note 90, at 133. "Privacy" and "confidentiality" laws vary from state to
state. It may be possible to obtain access to a driver's cell phone records in litigation but not under
other circumstances. See, e.g., Joseph D. Nohavicka, Privacy, Discovery Collide over Cell Phone
Records in Auto Accident Litigation, L. TECH. NEWS, Feb. 26, 2010. In Detraglia v Grant, 890
N.Y.S. 2d 696, 697-98 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), the court held that, where there was evidence
supporting the plaintiff's contention that the defendant driver had been using his cell phone or other
wireless devices while driving, his cell phone records should be produced in discovery for in
camera review. Of course, the USA Patriot Act also authorizes the FBI to undertake telephone
surveillance and obtain cell phone records under certain circumstances. Charlie Savage, Deal
Reachedon Extension of Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2011, at A16.
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presumably motor vehicle accidents), despite observed decreases in hand-held
cell phone use.'' It is hypothesized that drivers seeking to evade the ban resort
to more surreptitious activity, holding their cell phones not by their ears, where
they could be observed, but in their laps, leading to drivers taking their eyes off
the road for even longer periods of time. 0 2 This hypothesis is also supported by
a 2010 study examining the impact of texting bans in California, Louisiana,
Minnesota, and Washington state. The study found that not only were texting
bans not associated with a decrease in collision claims, in three out of four states
the bans were associated with increased collision rates, particularly for drivers
under age twenty-five, who in general are at highest risk of car crashes.'0 3
Nonetheless, the momentum for enacting bans on cell phone use,
particularly in regard to texting, appears to be gaining strength.1°4 Transportation
Secretary Ray LaHood has convened two federal summits on the problem of
distracted driving,'0 5 and his efforts have been joined by other traffic safety
advocates, 1 6 particularly those concerned with the special dangers presented by
teen driving.'07
The Obama Administration has taken a number of steps to limit cell
phone use in areas where the federal government has authority to act. It has
focused on texting as the most serious threat to public safety, citing a 2009 study
of commercial motor vehicle drivers using in-vehicle observational technology
that found that the risk of a crash or "near crash" was twenty-three times more
10' The study examined collision claim data in the jurisdictions with bans, comparing claims
incidence before and after the ban and comparing it with collision data in neighboring states. The
data in the states with enacted prohibitions essentially paralleled the data in the non-ban states
serving as controls. HIGHWAY Loss DATA INST., HIGHWAY Loss DATA INSTITUTE BULLETIN:
HAND-HELD CELLPHONE LAWS AND COLLISION CLAIM FREQUENCIES 1-3, 5 (2009), available at
http://www.iihs.org/research/topics/pdf/HLDlCellphoneBulletinDec9.pdf.
102 See HIGHWAY Loss DATA INST., supra note 19, at 8.103 Id. at 3-6.
104 Larry Copeland, Driver Phone Bans 'Impact Doubted: Push for Texting Laws Continues, U.S.A.
TODAY, Jan. 29, 2010, at Al; see also Cell Phone and Texting Laws, supra note 74 (documenting
increasing number of states and territories with complete or partial bans on hand-held cell phone
use and texting while driving).
105 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Transp., supra note 10.
106 The Department of Transportation has worked to establish the victims' advocacy group
FocusDriven. Id; see also Stephanie Hanes, Report: Cell Phone Distraction Causes One in Four
US Car Crashes, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 12, 2010, www.csmonitor.com/
USA/2010/0112/Report-Cell-phone-distraction-causes-one-in-four-US-car-crashes (describing the
formation of FocusDriven). Janet Froetscher, the President of the National Safety Council, has also
been an active campaigner against the use of cell phones while driving, emphasizing the need of the
business community to act to prevent their employees from using cell phones. Press Release, Nat'l
Safety Council, National Safety Council President Joins Transportation Secretary LaHood to
Address Distracted Driving (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.nsc.org/Pages/
NSCPresidentJoinsTransportationSecretaryLaHood.aspx.
107 Larry Copeland, "Awareness Gap" on Road Texting: Despite the Data, Teens Missing Message
on Risks, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 20, 2010, at A3.
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likely when drivers were texting than when they were not distracted. 10 8 President
Obama has issued an Executive Order banning federal employees from texting
while driving,'09 and the Department of Transportation has promulgated
regulations prohibiting texting by commercial motor vehicle operators when they
are driving in interstate commerce. 110 The Transportation Department is also
currently developing guidelines to address the safety issues raised by the
expanding development of built-in vehicle technology."' The federal
government has recently launched a new website, www.distraction.gov, 12 that
brings together both legal information and advocacy resources.
In October 2010 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) announced an initiative to encourage employers to adopt a policy
against texting while driving as a means of complying with their duty under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act to provide a safe workplace." 3 In a letter to
employers, OSHA declared that the leading cause of worker deaths is motor
vehicles. 14 It further announced that in order to meet their "responsibility and
legal obligation to create and maintain a safe and healthful workplace,"
employers must adopt workplace policies that not only do not require employees
108 See Regulatory Guidance Concerning the Applicability of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations to Texting by Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers, 75 Fed. Reg. 4305, 4306-07 (Jan.
27, 2010) (citing study by Hickman et al., supra note 40); see also Press Release, Dep't of
Transportation, U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood Kicks Off National Distracted Driving
Summit (Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/us-transportation-
secretary-ray-lahood-kicks-second-national-distracted-driving-summit.
109 See Exec. Order No. 13,513, 3 C.F.R. 246 (2010). Each federal department or agency is
responsible for issuing "guidance" to its workers and contractors to implement the Executive Order
by prohibiting employees from texting "while driving on official business or using government-
supplied equipment" and by "encouraging" government contractors to adopt similar policies for
their employees. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR GUIDANCE
RELEASE (DIG) 2010-04 (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/archive/pam/DIG_2010-
04[l].pdf.
110 Limiting the Use of Wireless Communication Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,118 (Sept. 27, 2010)
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 383-84, 390-92). These regulations prohibit texting by holders of
commercial motor vehicle licenses while driving in interstate commerce and also impose sanctions
which prohibit drivers holding these licenses who have violated either the regulation or applicable
state law from driving for periods ranging from 60 to 120 days (in effect, suspending their license).
ld. at 59,134-36.
111 White, supra note 83.
112 See About Us, DISTRACTION.GOV, http://www.distraction.gov (last visited July 19, 2012); see
also Larry Copeland, LaHood Seeks Federal Texting-While-Driving Ban, U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 8,
2011, http://www.usatoday.comi/news/nation/story/2011-12-07/texting-while-driving-ban/
51722780/l?loc=interstitialskip; Lorien Crow, Distracted Driving on the Rise, Researchers Find,
MOBILEDIA (Dec. 12,2011), http://www.mobiledia.com/news/120122.html.
113 See Letter from David Michaels, Assistant Sec'y, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., to
Employers (Oct 4, 2010), available at http://www.osha.gov/distracted-driving/index.html. Under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act's general duty rule, an employer "shall furnish to each of
his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees . 29 U.S.C.
§ 654(a)(1) (2006).
114 Letter from David Michaels, supra note 113.
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to text while driving but that also do not "create incentives that encourage or
condone" texting or make texting "a practical necessity for workers to carry out
their job."'15 The letter contained a thinly-veiled threat that employers who did
not adopt policies that prohibited and discouraged texting while driving by their
employees would be subject to inspection and sanctions.116 So far no action has
been taken by OSHA against any employer, but employers and their insurers are
well aware of the agency's concerns,' 17 as well as the threat of tort suits and
workers' compensation claims being brought against an employer whose
employee's communications while driving cause death or injury." 8
Over the last five years, several federal lawmakers have proposed laws to
limit drivers' use of cell phones, especially for texting, but none have been
enacted." 9 Generally, these laws build on the existing framework of federal
transportation safety law, in which the federal government provides funding to
states that enact laws effectuating a federal purpose."O Thus, the recently-
115 Id.116 id.
117 See Boyd Byers, Get the Message: OSHA Says Employers Must Ban Texting While Driving,
KAN. EMP'T LAW LETrER, Nov. 2010, available at http://www.hrhero.com/
hi/articles/2010/12/02/osha-says-employers-must-ban-texting-while-driving/.
118 1d.; see also infra Part I1.D.
119 See, e.g., Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act of 2011, S. 453, 112th Cong., (2011) (introduced by
Senator Sherrod Brown, authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate regulations
prohibiting the use of wireless devices by motor coach drivers, apparently expanding the
prohibitions on texting by commercial motor vehicle operators driving in interstate commerce
contained in regulations promulgated by the Secretary and discussed supra notes I I and 110 and
accompanying text); Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act of 2011, H.R. 873, 112th Cong., (2011)
(introduced by Representative John Lewis, tracking S. 453, supra); Distracted Driving Prevention
Act of 2009, S. 1938, 111Ith Cong. (2009) (introduced by Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, with
provisions generally tracking those of the Distracted Driving Prevention Act of 2011, H.R. 1772,
112th Cong. (2011), discussed infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text); S. 1536, 11 1th Cong.
(2009) (introduced by Senator Charles Schumer, proposing that twenty-five percent of states'
federal highway funds be withheld if states do not enact laws banning texting while driving); H.R.
4153, 111 th Cong. (2009) (introduced by Representative Todd Russell Platts, amending Title 23 of
the U.S. Code to withhold federal funds for fiscal years 2012 to 2015 if a state failed to enact or
enforce a law prohibiting certain types of wireless communications while driving).
120 The federal government has long finessed federalism questions by offering states financial
incentives to enact laws to promote goals Congress deems worthy, including the Medicaid
program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396w-5 (2006), and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,
42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2006), which changed the substantive requirements and procedures for child
abuse reporting. The federal government has been involved in highway safety issues since 1966.
See Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731; National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718; see also Tuncay Duma, MADD,
Drunk Driving, and Deterrence: The Impact of State Laws on Individual Attitudes and Behavior 37
(Dec. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State University) (on file with author). These
financial incentives have continued. In 1984, Congress enacted the National Minimum Drinking
Age Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, 98 Stat. 435 (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006)), which
reduced federal funding by five percent and ten percent for states that did not enact a minimum
drinking age of twenty-one by October 1, 1986 and October 1, 1987, respectively. See Anne T.
McCartt et al., The Effects of Minimum Legal Drinking Age 21 Laws on Alcohol-Related Driving in
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proposed Distracted Driving Prevention Act of 2011121 would provide grants to
states that adopt laws that prohibit texting or the use of hand-held phones while
driving, implement the prohibition through primary enforcement, 122 offer
escalating penalties for repeat violators or those who cause an accident while
engaging in prohibited communications, and require state motor vehicle
departments to educate and test drivers about distracted driving issues and collect
data about motor vehicle accidents that includes information about cell phone
use. 123 In addition, the Act would authorize the Administrator of the National
Highway Safety Administration to establish an anti-distracted driving education
program and a research program on driver behavior and technology relevant to
distracted driving. 124  Similarly, the Safe Drivers Act of 2011125 would
incentivize states to ban the use of hand-held cell phones while driving by
withholding twenty-five percent of federal highway construction funds from
states without such bans and would also authorize the Secretary of Transportation
to conduct a comprehensive study of distracted driving. 126  However,
Congressional representatives have criticized these and similar measures as
inconsistent with federalism principles, and even the proposal in the current
federal highway transportation reauthorization bill to provide states with
the United States, 41 J. SAFETY REs. 173, 176-77 (2010). In addition, Congress has been
involved-albeit inconsistently-with motorcycle safety. Congress has twice enacted, and then
repealed, laws providing financial incentives for states to adopt mandatory helmet laws. See
Christopher P. Ogolla & Frederic E. Shaw, Is the Repeal of Mandatory Motorcycle Helmet
Legislation a Contributing Factor to Traumatic Injury as a Public Health Problem?
Recommendations for the Future, 14 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 163, 189-90 (2010). Two federal
transportation programs administered by the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration specifically target state seat belt programs for privately-owned passenger motor
vehicles: the Section 405 program (Occupant Protection Incentive Grants), 23 U.S.C. § 405(f)
(2006), and Section 406 program (Safety Belt Performance Grants), 23 U.S.C. § 406 (2006). The
federal government also actively promotes seat belt use by offering states financial incentives to
adopt primary enforcement seatbelt laws. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1545
(2005), provides financial incentives to states that adopt programs to encourage the use of seat
belts, child safety seats, and motorcyclist safety. SAFETEA-LU was enacted in 2005, with a
September 2009 expiration date, and President Obama has twice reauthorized the law. See
VERMETTE, supra note 7, at 14.
121 H.R. 1772, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by Representative Elliott Engel of New York). A
similar bill was previously introduced by Senator John D. Rockefeller IV. See Distracted Driving
Prevention Act of 2009, S. 1938, 111 th Cong. (2009).
122 Primary enforcement laws are those that permit police and other law enforcement officers to
stop a motorist for an observed violation of that law. They are contrasted with secondary
enforcement laws, in which law enforcement officers can only cite a driver for violating that law if
the officer has already stopped the driver for another, primary enforcement offense. See, e.g., Div.
OF UNINTENTIONAL INJURY PREVENTION, NAT'L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, POLICY
IMPACT: SEAT BELTS 6 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/seatbeltbrief/.
123 H.R. 1772 §§ 2,4.
124 Id. at §§ 3-6.
125 H.R. 2333, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by Representative Carolyn McCarthy).
126 Id. §§ 3-4.
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financial incentives to enact bans on texting has proven controversial.'27 To date,
Congress has enacted only toothless exhortatory laws, such as resolutions
proclaiming April 2010 to be National Distracted Driving Month 28 or November
29, 2009 to be Drive Safer Sunday. 2 9
C. Special Concerns about Teen Drivers
As noted earlier, teenagers are much more likely to be involved in motor
vehicle accidents, and to die from them, than older drivers. 3 ° This is consistent
with teen behavior in general: due to their still-developing brains and their more
limited life experience, they are more impulsive, less able to control their
conduct, and frequently poorer at making decisions.' 3 ' The Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized these aspects of adolescence, finding teens to be "less
mature and responsible than adults" and less likely to "recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them."'32  Teens are especially likely to
engage in risky behavior, reflecting their immature brains, which are hard-wired
to seek novelty and excitement as part of the developmental process of learning
to be independent from adults. 133 The dangers of teen driving are exacerbated by
teens' significant use of cell phones while driving, especially text messaging.
34
These figures are particularly alarming because teen drivers are less likely than
adults to use seat belts, particularly when there is another teenager present as a
passenger.1
35
127 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
128 S. Res. 510, 11 1th Cong. (2009) (enacted) (introduced by Senator Amy Klobuchar); H.R. Res.
1 186, 11 1th Cong. (2009) (enacted) (introduced by Representative Betsy Markey).
129 H.R. Res. 841, 1 1th Cong. (2009) (enacted) (introduced by Representative Jim Gerluch,
encouraging educational institutions, trucking firms, clergy, law enforcement, and the general
public to promote motor vehicle driving safety).
130 VERMETTE, supra note 7, at 22 (noting that "[t]een drivers (between 16 and 19) are involved in
fatal crashes at four times the rate of adult drivers (25 to 69), per mile driven."). As a result,
insurance premiums are much higher for drivers under age 25. See, e.g., Justin Stoltzfus, Higher
Grades Can Mean Lower Premiums for Teen Drivers, AUTOINSURANCEQUOTES.COM (Jan. 21,
2011), http://www.autoinsurancequotes.com/news/higher-grades-can-mean-lower-premiums-for-
teen-drivers/; Top 3 Reasons for Higher Auto Insurance Quotes for Males Under 25,
AUTOINSJRANCEQUOTE.COM (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.autoinsurancequote.com/articles/top-3-
reasons-higher-auto-insurance-quotes-men-25.html.
131 Anita Slomski, The Teenage Brain, PROTO MAGAZINE, Fall 2010, at 26, 27-31, available at
http://protomag.com/statics/MGHFlOjuvenileFl.pdf.
"' J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402-03 (2011) (summarizing the long history of the
Court's observations about juvenile actors in the course of determining that a juvenile suspect's age
must be taken into account in deciding whether he is in custody for purposes of Miranda analysis).
133 Slomski, supra note 131, at 30.
134 See supra notes 30-33.
35 See Anne T. McCartt & Veronika Shabanova Northrup, Factors Related to Seat Belt Use Among
Fatally Injured Teenage Drivers, 35 J. SAFETY REs. 29, 29 (2004); A.F. Williams, Young Driver
Risk Factors: Successful and Unsuccessful Approaches for Dealing with Them and an Agenda for
the Future, 12 INJ. PREVENTION i4, i4 (Supp. 1 2006).
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These risks have prompted state legislators, researchers, and policy
advocates to consider a broad range of solutions to try to reduce the incidence of
motor vehicle accidents, particularly fatal ones, among teenagers. These include
the enactment of graduated driver licensing laws (GDL) 136 and an expanded
emphasis on the dangers of distracted driving in the learners' permitting process,
driver education programs, and the public media generally.137 Since 1996, nearly
all states have enacted laws that have lengthened the process by which teens
attain full driving privileges. 3 8 These graduated licensing laws generally contain
several components: an increased age at which the driver is eligible to apply for a
learner's permit and full (unrestricted) license, minimum periods (usually six to
twelve months) during which the driver must drive under a learner's permit (i.e.,
with adult supervision), mandatory driver education courses, and limitations on
the circumstances in which the novice driver may operate a motor vehicle (e.g.,
with teenage passengers, after dark, or with a cell phone). 139 States vary in the
extent to which they elongate the licensing process, provide for extended periods
of supervision, and limit driving under more hazardous circumstances. 40 For
example, New Jersey is the only state in which all new drivers under age twenty-
one are required to display a decal indicating their novice status.
14 1
Stronger GDL laws are associated with greater reductions in the rates of
teen driver collisions. 142 The provisions with the greatest impact are those that
require more hours of driving practice, most restrict nighttime driving, and limit
the number of passengers in the car. 143 As a result, many commentators advocate
expanding and enhancing GDL programs to provide a longer, more supervised
learning experience. 144 Recently, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand and Representative
Timothy Bishop have proposed the Safe Teen and Novice Driver Uniform
Protection (STANDUP) Act. 145 This law would follow the familiar pattern of
136 See ARTHUR GOODWIN ET AL., AAA FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, PARENTS, TEENS, & THE
LEARNER STAGE OF GRADUATED DRIVER LICENSING (2010); McCartt et al., supra note 46, at 246;
McCartt et al., supra note 63, at 214.
137 See infra notes 142-59.
138 See GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 136, at 1-2; ALLAN F. WILLIAMS ET AL., AAA FOUND. FOR
TRAFFIC SAFETY, EVALUATION OF NEW JERSEY'S GRADUATED DRIVER LICENSING PROGRAM 5-7
(2010), available at http://www.aaafoundation.org/pdfINJGDLevalFinalReport.pdf; Graduated
Driver Licensing (GDL) Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS'N (Aug. 2012),
http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/license laws.html.
139 Williams, supra note 135, at 4-6; Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) Laws, supra note 138.
140 Summary Table: Young Driver Licensing Systems in the U.S., INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY
(Aug. 2011), http://www.iihs.org/laws/GraduatedLicenseCompare.aspx.
141 Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) Laws, supra note 138.
142 See REBECCA E. TREMPEL, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, GRADUATED LICENSING LAWS AND
INSURANCE COLLISION CLAIM FREQUENCIES OF TEENAGE DRIVERS 1, 6 (2009).
14 See id. at 6, 7.
144 See id at 9; McCartt et al., supra note 46, at 246; McCartt, supra note 63, at 209-18; Williams,
supra note 135, at 21-22.
141 S. 528, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand); see also H.R. 1515,
112th Cong. (2011) (companion bill introduced by Representative Timothy Bishop).
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providing a combination of grants and withholdings under the federal highway
construction program to encourage states to adopt laws to implement or improve
their GDL programs. 146 Key provisions of the STANDUP Act would extend and
enhance the quality of the preliminary and intermediate licensing process,
prevent full licensure until age eighteen, limit the circumstances under which
teens could drive without supervision, and prohibit the use of cell phones while
driving for all drivers under eighteen.
147
Although GDL programs are associated with lower crash and fatality
rates for teens, the means by which they reduce the incidence of accidents and
fatalities among teen drivers is not clear. 148 For example, is it simply by delaying
the age at which one can begin to learn to drive that drivers become safer
(presumably because their brains have had a few more months to mature, with
concomitant improvements in perception, reflexes, and judgment), or is it the
opportunity that graduated licensing gives for more driving experience, as well as
supervised practice driving under difficult conditions (e.g., at night, on two lane
roads, with potentially distracting passengers) that makes teens safer drivers once
they receive their full license? 149 One review of GDL programs found that states
with laws prohibiting newly-licensed teen drivers from having any teenage
passengers had fatal crash rates that were twenty-one percent lower than states
without such prohibitions.' 50  An intensive study of the North Carolina GDL
program, which used in-car cameras to capture the experience of teens learning
to drive with their parents, found that most teen drivers were not given significant
opportunity to drive in more hazardous conditions (e.g., curvy country roads,
heavy traffic, or inclement weather such as rain or snow).'' This study also
found that parents supervising teens with learners' permits are more likely to
educate their children about the mechanics of driving (i.e., accelerating, braking,
turning) than about the cognitive skills that are necessary to become a good
driver (i.e., anticipating the need to brake by seeing the brake lights of cars
ahead, being aware of peripheral objects and hazardous road conditions, and
driving defensively).152 Citing these studies, Anne McCartt, a noted traffic safety
146 See S. 528 §§ 3-5; see also STANDUP ACT, SAFEROADS4TEENS.ORG,
http://www.saferoads4teens.org/standup-act (last visited July 8, 2011).
147 S. 528 § 3.
148 GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 136, at 1-2.
149 See TREMPEL, supra note 142, at 9 (finding that lengthening the "holding period" during which a
teen must drive with a learner's permit had no independent impact on teen collision rates, apart
from the fact that it increased the age at which the driver was ultimately licensed); WILLIAMS ET
AL., supra note 138, at 6, 21 (documenting uncertainty as to whether increased age or increased
experience is responsible for crash rates reduced by GDL); McCartt et al., supra note 63, at 209-18
(summarizing numerous studies showing that both increased age and greater driving experience
were independently associated with lower auto crash rates).
'50 McCartt et al., supra note 46, at 246.
151 GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 136, at vi-xi.
152 Id. at x-xiii.
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expert, has concluded that there is no substitute for actual driving experience in a
broad array of challenging road conditions.'53
Despite the success of GDL programs, many commentators have
identified a need to give greater attention to the dangers of cell phone use while
driving as part of new drivers' education and licensing. 154 States have only
recently begun to place an emphasis on the risks of cell use in the standard driver
education program, which is where most teens receive their formal driver
training. 155 Only thirty-two states and the District of Columbia include materials
on distracted driving in their driver's license manuals, 156 and fewer than twenty
states require distracted driving to be addressed in driver's education classes or
include at least one question on these risks in the tests given to obtain a learner's
permit.157 Less than a third of states take advantage of teenagers' heavy use of
social networking by using those sites to promote anti-distracted driving
messages. 158 However, a recently-developed advertising campaign, cosponsored
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, state attorneys general,
and state consumer protection agencies, seeks to change the teenage culture in
which mobile device use, even while driving, is the norm.
159
D. Can Tort Litigation Discourage the Use of Mobile Devices?
Drivers' increasing use of cell phones has been accompanied by a
concomitant rise in tort litigation brought by motorists and pedestrians alleging
that they were injured in an accident caused by a driver who was distracted by
the use of a cell phone. Most of these are garden-variety negligence suits, in
which liability depends on whether the driver and injured party were driving with
appropriate care (including questions of comparative negligence), whether the
driver's alleged cell phone use was the proximate cause of the accident, whether
153 McCartt et al., supra note 63, at 218.
154 See, e.g., Teens and Cell Phone Safety, CELLPHONESAFETY.ORG, http://www.cellphonesafety.
org/safer/teens.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2012); Lesson Plans, N.J. DRIVER'S EDUC.,
http://www.njdrivereducation.com/lessonplans (last visited Oct. 19, 2012) (including lesson plans
discussing dangers of cell phone use and texting while driving); Tell Us: Should Driver's Ed Deal
With Texting While Driving?, NORTHESCAMBIA.COM (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.northescambia.
com/2011/02/should-drivers-ed-deal-with-texting-while-driving (noting that two California state
legislatures have proposed legislation to require this).
155 Thirty-six states require driver education in order to get a learner's permit or provisional license.
VERMETIE, supra note 7, at 27 (summarizing current state laws as well as changes in state drivers
education laws and materials referring to different kinds of distracted driving between 2003 and
2010).
151 Id. at 29.
157 Id. at 27 (noting that as of June 2010 information on distracted driving is required for drivers'
education in eighteen states plus the District of Columbia and that the drivers' license test includes
a question on distracted driving in seventeen states plus the District of Columbia).
.
58 Id. at 32.
159 Copeland, supra note 6.
2012]
HeinOnline  -- 81 UMKC L. Rev. 155 2012
UMKC LA W REVIEW
the injured party could have avoided the accident, and of course whether the
driver's negligence caused damages.1 60 In most states the driver's violation of a
statutory prohibition on certain types of cell phone use is simply evidence
relevant to the issue of negligence, 161 but some statutes create a rebuttable
presumption of negligence based on the use of a cell phone.
161
Over the last decade, a handful of lawsuits have been brought against
employers for accidents allegedly caused by an employee's use of a cell phone
while driving. 163  In the twenty-first century workplace, many employees are
expected to be on call virtually 24/7; their bosses expect them to be easily
reachable by phone and email throughout the day, if not also the night.' 64 This
reality makes it ever more likely that employers will be held liable in tort for
their employees' dangerous cell phone-related conduct. 165 Employers have been
held liable under the theory of respondeat superior when juries found that their
employees had used cell phones while driving during business hours to make
calls that caused an accident or drove while making business phone calls even
after work. 166 A number of other cases have been settled prior to, or after, trial.1
67
In addition, some lawsuits have asserted liability based on direct negligence,
contending that employers who either permit or encourage employees to conduct
business via cell phone without sufficient training about the dangers of driving
while using a phone are negligent because they have breached their duty to
160 See Meghan K. Loftus, Causes of Action Arising out of Cell Phone Use While Operating a
Motor Vehicle, 35 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 151 §§ 5-9 (2007 & Supp.); Jay M. Zitter, Civil Liability
Arising from Use of Cell Phone While Driving, 36 A.L.R. 6th 443 §§ 4-8 (2008).
161 See Loftus, supra note 160, at §§ 5-6 (citing Scianni v. Suriano, 2007 WL 506206 (N.J. Super
Ct. App. Div. Feb. 20, 2007), and Low v. Stephens, 127 Wash. App. 1051 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)).
162 See id. § 6.
163 See Jordan Michael, Liability for Accidents from Use and Abuse of Cell Phones: When Are
Employers and Cell Phone Manufacturers Liable?, 79 N.D. L. REV. 299, 302-06 (2003)
(summarizing litigation).
164 See, e.g., Caroline M.L. Potter, Tips for Online Shopping on the Job, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Dec. 13, 2011 ("I think that today most people expect there to be a merger of personal and
professional time, since most of us are basically on call for work 24/7 with our BlackBerrys.").
165 Id. at 305.
166 Id. at 303-05. Cases finding employers liable include: Hunter v. Modem Cont'l Const. Co., Inc.,
652 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007), CLO White Co. v. Lattimore, 590 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003); Ellender v. Neff Rental, Inc., 965 So. 2d 898 (La. Ct. App. 2007). At the same time, courts
have made it clear that whether the employee was actually using or reaching for the cell phone at
the time of the accident, whether the call was related to the employer's business, and whether the
cell phone use caused the accident are all questions of fact. See McClelland v. Simon-Williamson
Clinic, 933 So. 2d 367, 370-71 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); Easterling v. Man-O-War Auto., Inc., 223
S.W.3d 852, 855-56 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); Zitter, supra note 160 (reviewing other cases using the
theory of vicarious liability to hold employers liable for the cell phone-related accidents of their
employees or agents).
167 See Dusty Horwitt, Note, Driving While Distracted: How Should Legislators Regulate Cell
Phone Use Behind the Wheel?, 28 J. LEGIS. 185, 198 (2002); Loftus, supra note 160, at § 13 (citing
Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, Are You as an Employer Liable for Employee
Who Causes an Accident While Driving and Using a Cell Phone, 18 No. 12 EMPL. L. UPDATE 1
(2004)).
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minimize a foreseeable risk of harm. 6  The threat of tort liability may be more
effective against employers than individuals, 169 particularly larger employers or
those with extra-deep pockets. Thus, a rational employer might choose to
minimize this risk by developing, and enforcing, policies against employees' use
of cell phones while driving. 0
A novel legal argument, as yet untested, is that since all employers have
a general duty to provide a safe workplace under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act,17 1 any employer who fails to have in place and enforce a policy
strictly prohibiting cell phone use while driving has violated a statutory duty and
is therefore negligent per se.' 72 Most courts have held that a violation of a federal
statute should give rise to an inference of negligence under state tort law,
although this view has been criticized.'7 3 The question is further complicated
because almost all state statutes that prohibit texting or hand-held cell phone use
while driving are silent on the question of whether such conduct is negligence per
se.
174
Additionally, some commentators have suggested that workers'
compensation law may provide an attractive, no-fault scheme for compensating
employees who are injured in a motor vehicle accident caused, at least in part, by
their use of a cell phone while driving, as long as they can establish that they
were using the phone in the course of conducting the employer's business.' 75
In contrast to the expanded liability of employers, cell phone
manufacturers and carriers have so far been protected from lawsuits. To date, no
court has held that mere foreseeability that a cell phone owner could use a cell
phone while driving is sufficient to impose liability against the carrier that
furnished him with the phone. 76  In the first major decision addressing this
168 Michael, supra note 163, at 305-06.
169 See infra Parts III.A-B (discussing the limits of deterrence in changing behavior).
170 Horwitt, supra note 166, at 197-99.
7' 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006).
172 Although this theory is untested, OSHA has suggested that employers who require, encourage,
or condone employees to text while driving will be found to have failed to fulfill their statutory
duty to provide a safe workplace. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
173 See Barbara Kritchevsky, Tort Law Is State Law: Why Courts Should Distinguish State and
Federal Law in Negligence-Per-Se Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REv. 71, 72-73 (2010) (summarizing
case law and arguing that the prevailing approach is inconsistent with the underlying justification
for imposing negligence per se).
174 See Loftus, supra note 160, at §§ 5-6. But see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-137.4A(c) (2009)
(explicitly declaring that a violation of the prohibition against texting while driving does not
constitute negligence per se).
175 See Jon Gelman, Employers Face Liability for Cell Phone Accidents, WORKERS' COMPENSATION
(July 5, 2011), http://workers-compensation.blogspot.com/2011/07/employers-face-liability-for-
cell-phone.html.
176 See Jordan B. Michael, Automobile Accidents Associated with Cell Phone Use: Can Cell Phone
Service Providers and Manufacturers Be Held Liable Under A Theory of Negligence?, I1 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 5, 48-50 (2005) (discussing possible theories to open up this hitherto closed avenue of
litigation).
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theory, Williams v. Cingular Wireless,' 77 the Indiana Court of Appeals held that
an injured driver suing the carrier Cingular Wireless failed to state a cause of
action for negligence based on allegations that Cingular should have known that
the customer to whom it provided a cell phone would use it while driving. 78 The
court found that although it was foreseeable that a cell phone would be used by a
driver, this was insufficient to impose a duty on the carrier to prevent harm to a
third-party driver, unknown to the carrier. 79 The court declined the invitation to
create a new common law duty, relying on several factors: the lack of a
contractual relationship between the cell phone company and the injured
driver,18° the failure of the injured plaintiff to show that the phone had
malfunctioned, 18' and the inability of the cell phone company to control the
conduct of the cell phone wielding driver. 182  The court reasoned that if it
imposed a duty on cell phone carriers to protect people from injuries caused by
drivers who use their cell phones in a dangerous manner, this would "effectively
require [cell phone companies] .. .to stop selling cellular phones entirely."' 183
Instead, the court deferred to the legislature to adopt appropriate measures to
protect the public from the dangers of cell phone use while driving. 84  The
Cingular case has been relied on by courts around the country to reach similar
conclusions. 85  Additionally, strict liability theories, such as manufacturing
defect, design defect, or failure to warn of the danger of foreseeable unsafe uses,
might be used to impose liability on a cell phone carrier, phone manufacturer, or
automobile manufacturer.' 
86
17' 809 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
171 Id. at 475-77.
179 Id.
"0 Id. at 477.
1 Id. at 478.
182 Id. at 479.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 See, e.g., Bailey v. Estate of Jett, No. 1:10cv144, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9284, at *10-11
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 31, 2011) (holding, in a diversity suit against the manufacturer of a texting system
sold to a trucking firm, that even if the truck's driver was proven to have engaged in negligent
driving related to that texting system, the manufacturer had no duty to unknown motorists); Estate
of Doyle v. Sprint/Nextel Corp., 248 P.3d 947, 951-52 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011) (holding that the
seller and manufacturer of a cell phone had no duty to a driver killed by a driver using a cell phone
furnished by the defendants).
186 See Michael, supra note 163, at 307-09 (summarizing applicable legal theories).
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III. LESSONS OF DETERRENCE
A. General Deterrence Principles
Deterrence is a fundamental principle of American jurisprudence. 187 As
all first year law students know, its central tenet is that the fear of being caught,
convicted, and punished encourages potential offenders to obey the law.' 8 As
explained by Jeremy Bentham, one of deterrence's early theorists, human beings
are rational actors-"economic m[e]n"-who, when deciding whether or not to
commit a crime, will calculate the crime's potential benefits and then compare
them to the risks of being apprehended, convicted, and punished. 189 Bentham
hypothesized that three factors are key to the deterrent impact of a particular
criminal sanction: the certainty, severity, and celerity (swiftness) of
punishment.
1 90
Other scholars emphasize that achieving deterrence is more complicated
than simply encouraging citizens to engage in individual cost-benefit analyses.
Deterrence depends in part on two long-term processes--moral education and
habit formation-to change behavior; the criminalization of certain acts makes
them less likely to be committed.1 91 This phenomenon was recognized in the
nineteenth century by sociologist Emile Durkheim, who asserted that a criminal
conviction had the effect of boundary definition, marking off what is and is not
187 See Johannes Andenaes, Deterrence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & PUNISHMENT 507, 508
(David Levinson ed., 2002); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950
(2003).
188 Robinson & Darley, supra note 187, at 950, 955. Deterrence has two aspects: so-called
"specific deterrence," which operates on persons who have offended and, because of their
familiarity with the sanction imposed, are less likely to commit the offense again; and "general
deterrence," or the ability of a criminal prohibition or enforcement policy to prevent crime from
being committed in the first place. See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 92-97 (8th ed. 2007). This article will focus on general
deterrence. Scholars also discuss the moral educational effect of the criminal sanction (i.e., the
ability of criminal punishment to influence societal beliefs in the wrongfulness of the underlying
conduct). See ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN
ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 3 (1999); Andenaes, supra note 187, at 508.
189 Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition, 113
PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 498 (1993) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS LEGISLATION (1789)). Cesare Beccaria, a contemporary of Bentham, adopted a similar
position on the logic of deterrence. See Greg Pogarsky, Identifying "Deterrable" Offenders,
Implications for Research on Deterrence, 19 JUST. Q. 431, 431 (2002) (citing CESARE BECCARIA,
ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1764)).
190 MacCoun, supra note 188, at 498; see also Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-
Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into
Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 707, 711-13 (2000) (describing
the social control model of deterrence).
191 Duma, supra note 120, at 20-25.
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socially acceptable. 92 In the mid-twentieth century, Scandinavian criminologists
like Johannes Andenaes also emphasized the general preventative impact of
deterrence, focusing on the moral educational force of the criminal law as well as
the positive effects of habitually performing actions that are shaped by
knowledge of the law. 193 More recently, social psychologists like Tom Tyler
have affirmed the importance of the law's moral force in finding that people's
values (including their views of lawmaking legitimacy as well as the morality of
specific behavior) can affect the deterrent impact of a particular criminal law.'94
All scholars agree that deterrence works in the most general sense. The
simple existence of a system of investigation, prosecution, conviction, and
punishment for crimes serves to decrease the overall amount of crime
committed.1 95 Yet most criminal justice policy decisions involve questions of
marginal, rather than absolute, deterrence and thus require an assessment of the
difference that a particular change in sentence severity or law enforcement policy
will have on crime rates. In order to understand how the costs and benefits of a
specific criminal justice policy (be it creating a new crime, changing the sanction
associated with an existing crime, or altering the law enforcement strategy and
resources devoted to a particular crime) will affect individual behavior, one must
consider the relative importance of deterrence's underlying pillars: certainty,
severity, and celerity of punishment.
Deterrence research has shown that deterrence is perceptual: potential
offenders cannot be deterred without first perceiving that their violations of the
law carry a significant risk of apprehension and conviction. 96 Unless potential
offenders are aware that the sanction for a particular crime has been increased or
that law enforcement efforts have been expanded, such changes in criminal
justice policy will do little to affect citizens' behavior. 97  There are five
important factors that influence the likelihood that offenders will change their
behavior in response to a change in the risk of sanction:
192 See KADISH ET AL., supra note 187, at 90-91 (citing EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR
IN SOCIETY 62-63 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984).
193 See Andenaes, supra note 187, at 508; see also Duma, supra note 120, at 11-12.
194 See Tyler & Darley, supra note 190, at 714; see also MacCoun, supra note 189, at 503
(asserting that the perceived morality of an act affects the deterrent powers of particular
punishments).
195 See VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 188, at 1.
196 Id. at 6-9. In part, this may be due to individual variations in the extent to which people
consider events in the future to be relevant to them. Studies have found that those "who discount
the future more heavily are less likely to be deterred by a given punishment." Shawn Bushway &
Peter Reuter, Economists' Contribution to the Study of Crime and the Criminal Justice System, 37
CRIME & JUST. 389, 405 (2008).
19 See Kirk R. Williams & Jack P. Gibbs, Deterrence and Knowledge of Statutory Penalties, 22
Soc. Q. 591, 591 (1981); see also Ross, supra note 22, at 46-47 (emphasizing the need for changes
in penal policy-whether in enforcement or severity of sanctions-to be communicated to the
public, usually through mass media publicity); Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and
Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 166 (2009) (describing the need for visibility as a requirement
that sanctions be "in your face").
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1) A potential offender must realise that the probability of conviction or
the severity of punishment has changed....
2) A potential offender must take these altered risks into account when
deciding whether to offend. If offenders act impulsively, or under the
influence of drugs or alcohol, their beliefs about punishment risks may
have less impact on their behavior....
3) A potential offender must believe that there is a non-negligible risk
of being caught .... This means that sanctions for prohibitions thought
to be poorly enforced are likely to have only a small deterrent impact.
4) A potential offender must believe that the altered penalty will be
applied to him if he is caught .... There may however, be numerous
intervening contingencies between being apprehended and actually
receiving the heightened penalty .... This can give offenders, if they
are "optimists," hope of escaping the increased penalty....
5) A potential offender must be willing to alter his or her choices
regarding offending in the light of the perceived change in certainty or
severity of punishment. . . If the criminal activity is of sufficient
importance in the potential offender's life because of the resources or
life-style it provides or the needs it fulfills, then enhanced certainty or
severity of punishment may not make him desist. This has been the
problem, for example, in applying drug prohibitions to active drug
users.
19 8
Although most politicians emphasize sentence severity as the key to
cutting crime, 99 scholars of deterrence have concluded overwhelmingly that
punishment that is certain has a much greater deterrent impact than a severe
punishment that is unlikely to be imposed. 0 0 Thus, for example, for years
scholars have urged policymakers to increase the certainty that offenders will be
apprehended and convicted (i.e., by spending more on police road blocks for
drunk driving or increasing border patrols to prevent violation of immigration
198 VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 188, at 7 (emphasis omitted; Arabic numerals substituted for
Roman numerals).
199 See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 19
(1995); see also Robinson & Darley, supra note 187, at 964-65.
200See VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 188, at 5-6, 14 (defining certainty as "the likelihood of being
arrested and convicted" and "severity" as referring both to whether the defendant will be
imprisoned if convicted and if so, for how long); Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster,
Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 187-89
(2003); Williams & Gibbs, supra note 197, at 593; see also Ross, supra note 22, at 58-59
(summarizing research on "driving under the influence" in the United States and in Europe, which
finds that severe sentences may sometimes result in lower rates of conviction and imprisonment,
due to the exercise of discretion by arresting officers, judges, and juries). That certainty is more
important than severity to potential criminals might be predicted from the nature of the American
criminal justice system, which involves many steps, from the initial criminal behavior to the
eventual imposition of sanction, including arrest, formal charging, trial, and conviction, all of
which can occasion the use and abuse of discretion by key actors. Cf. Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal
Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 34 (1998).
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laws) rather than increasing the sentence in a never-ending spiral of getting tough
201
on crime.
Finally, returning to the broad conception of deterrence noted earlier,2°2
potential offenders are less likely to respond to changes in the severity or
certainty of sanctions if they do not share the community's value system; that is,
they do not believe the conduct is morally wrong or do not have "'high [] stakes
in conventionality.' 20 3 The threat of a criminal sanction is most likely to be
effective for those who wish to be seen by others as law-abiding, as well as those
who have the most to lose from being convicted and sentenced to prison.2°
Thus, changes in law enforcement practices (e.g., arresting the offending party in
a domestic violence case, rather than separating the parties or dispensing advice)
have also been shown to be most effective where the offenders had strong social
relationships within the community and worked "least well where they had little
or nothing to lose.,
20 5
B. Deterrence and Drunk Driving
Efforts to minimize the harms caused by "drunk driving ' 206 demonstrate
the strengths and limits of using a criminal justice strategy to address a complex
social issue. Since the early 1980s there has been a nationwide campaign to
201 Ross, supra note 22, at 2-14; VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 188, at 5-77.
202 See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
203 VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 188, at 35 (quoting Daniel S. Nagin, General Deterrence:
Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, in 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 51, 70 (1998)).
204 Id. at 36. For example, studies of income tax evasion show that although many people say they
are willing to fudge the numbers somewhat on their tax returns when the penalties are only civil
and cannot be made public by the Internal Revenue Service, they are much less likely to cheat
when the result would be a criminal conviction. See, e.g., STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING,
AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 246-248 (2006); Daniel S. Nagin et
al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 166 (2009). Of course, income tax
evasion is a criminal act that has only monetary goals, as opposed to other crimes-like rape and
murder-which frequently have more complex emotional goals as well.
205 Id. at 36-37 (citing L.W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND
DILEMMAS (1992)).
206 1 use this common term to describe all prosecutions for "impaired" or "under the influence"
driving. Current state and federal laws do not require an individual to be drunk or heavily
intoxicated by alcohol or other drugs in order to be convicted. Instead, all states have followed the
federal government in setting a .08 blood alcohol level as the minimum required for conviction of
"driving under the influence" or "driving while impaired." See 23 U.S.C. § 163 (2006)
(establishing federal blood alcohol limit of .08, which states must follow if they are to receive
federal highway safety funds); DUI/DWI Laws, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY (Aug. 2012),
www.iihs.org/laws/dui.aspx (noting that all states comply with the federally mandated standard).
These laws recognize that consumption of very small drug amounts can impair judgment,
perception, and motor control, all of which raise the risk of motor vehicle accidents. See Ross
supra note 22, at 6, 19-2 1.
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address the deaths and injuries caused by drunk driving.207 This campaign has
been led by Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) 0 8 and other advocacy
groups who have refrained the act of driving under the influence of alcohol,
transforming it from a relatively minor traffic offense to a serious moral
transgression. °9 MADD has constructed the problem of drunk driving as one of
moral failure, focusing on the "sins" of "deviant" actors, who are declared to be
"killer drunks" rather than persons with a chronic health problem or occasional
over-imbibers. 21 0  By placing responsibility for the consequences of drunk
driving "'in the person rather than the bottle,"' 21 1 MADD and other victim
advocacy groups have ignored the facts showing that drunk driving reflects the
interaction of a number of biological, social, and environmental factors.212 The
phenomenon of drunk driving encompasses not only individuals who chronically
abuse alcohol but also the larger reality that America embraces social drinking
without providing accessible, affordable public transportation in many parts of
the country.213 This refraining of the situation, or "the [now] dominant
paradigm," as described by H. Laurence Ross, has meant that solutions to drunk
driving are sought in the criminal justice system rather than in broader social
policies about alcohol consumption and transportation.2t4
As a result of MADD's efforts and the willingness of state and federal
legislators to seize upon a high-gain, low-risk solution to a complex problem, a
raft of laws have been enacted to make it easier to convict and sanction those
who drive under the influence of alcohol.215 By the end of the twentieth century,
primarily as a result of federal financial incentives, all states had adopted aper se
model of impaired driving, which made driving with a specified blood alcohol
level a serious crime rather than presumptive evidence of impaired driving.
21 6
All states have reduced the permissible blood alcohol level for drivers from .10 to
207 See MADD Milestones: 25 Years of Making a Difference, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRrVING
(Fall 2005), http://www.madd.org/about-us/history/madd-milestones.pdf.
208 MADD was founded in 1980 by Candy Lightner, whose daughter was killed by a drunk driver
with multiple convictions. History of MADD, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING,
http://www.madd.org/about-us/history/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
209 See Ross, supra note 22, at 176-77.
210 Id. at 21-22; see also Duma, supra note 120, at 40-50, 57-59. This is similar to the approach
taken by the Reagan and Bush Administrations in their War on Drugs, although it is not clear that
the motivations of MADD are the same. See TONRY, supra note 199, at 121-23.
211 Durna, supra note 120, at 58 (quoting Craig Reinarman, The Social Construction of an Alcohol
Problem: The Case of Mothers Against Drunk Driving and Social Control in the 1980s, 17 THEORY
& SOC'Y 91, 110 (1988)).
212 Ross, supra note 22, at 28-34.
213 Durna, supra note 120, at 58.
214 Ross, supra note 22, at 1.
215 See Duma, supra note 120, at 44-49.
216 See 23 U.S.C. § 163 (2006); DUIDWI Laws, supra note 205. As noted earlier, the federal
government has been providing incentives for states to promote a variety of safe driving practices
since the 1960s. See supra note 120.
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.08 percent217 and adopted zero-tolerance laws for drivers under twenty-one, the
legal drinking age.21 8 Most states have authorized administrative sanctions, such
as automatic license suspension, for failing or refusing to take a Breathalyzer®
test.219
The current approach, which focuses on increasing sentence severity as
well as the certainty of being sanctioned, has been accompanied by substantial
reductions in the fatalities and injuries attributable to impaired driving.220
Apparently as a result of redefining drunk driving offenses, enhancing law
enforcement, implementing administrative sanctions, increasing media attention
on the dangers of drunk driving, and auto safety improvements, alcohol-related
fatality rates declined substantially between 1982 and 1994.221 This result is
consistent with Andenaes' theory that criminalizing certain conduct has a "moral
educative" as well as a "habit formation" effect.222
However, since 1994 drunk driving fatality rates have stabilized, 3
despite a number of law changes designed to make it easier and more certain to
detain, arrest, and convict drunk drivers.22 4  In 1982, fifty-one percent of all
driver fatalities involved a driver who consumed more than the legal alcohol
limit; between 1994 and 2008 that number ranged from thirty-two to thirty-five
percent. 225 The number of arrests for driving under the influence has remained
steady from 2000 to 2008,226 meaning that the chance of being arrested has
actually declined in light of increases in population and the number of licensed
217 See, e.g., Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 106-346, 114 Stat. 1356A-34.
218 These so-called "zero-tolerance" laws governing drivers under twenty-one make excessive
blood alcohol levels a per se violation. See Anne T. McCartt et al., Attitudes Toward In- Vehicle
Advanced Alcohol Detection Technology, 11 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 156, 156 (2010) [hereinafter
McCartt et al., Attitudes]; Anne T. McCartt et al., Effects of a College Community Campaign on
Drinking and Driving with a Strong Enforcement Component, 10 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 141,
141 (2009) [hereinafter McCartt et al., Effects]. These laws typically set a limit of no more than .02
percent blood alcohol level. Anne T. McCartt et al., Implementation of Washington State's Zero
Tolerance Law: Patterns ofArrests, Dispositions, and Recidivism, 8 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 339,
339 (2007) [hereinafter McCartt et al., Implementation].
2 19 Duma, supra note 120, at 19-20, 90.
220 Most studies focus on the decrease in fatal accidents in which alcohol consumption by the driver
is implicated; the underlying assumption appears to be that non-fatal accidents reflect the same
factors, although this may be complicated by other, non-alcohol related factors, such as seat belt
use, better-designed cars, and speedier and more successful medical interventions.
221 Durna, supra note 120, at 3-4.
222 See Anthony M. Bertelli & Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., The Behavioral Impact of Drinking and
Driving Laws, 36 POL'Y STUDIES J. 545, 562 (2008); see generally supra notes 190-93 and
accompanying text (discussing habit formation and Scandinavian theorists).
223 McCartt et al, Attitudes, supra note 218, at 156.
224 See Duma, supra note 120, at 37-39 (summarizing law changes from 1966 to the early 2000s).
225 MCCARTT ET AL., supra note 218, at 156.
226 Id.
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drivers. 227  The slight chance of being arrested for drunk driving has been
confirmed by studies: the estimated 1.5 million arrests for drunk driving each
year only account for 0.15 percent of the estimated one billion drives taken
within two hours of drinking,228 and a study published in 2000 found that the
probability of being arrested while driving with a blood alcohol level higher than
.10 is about one in 200 (or about .5 percent). 229
Given that the rate of traffic fatalities attributable to drunk driving has
remained steady for nearly twenty years, despite significant efforts to increase the
severity and certainty of drunk driving sanctions, it is apparent that deterrence
offers an incomplete solution to the problem of drunk driving.23° Empirical
studies show that increasing the severity of sanctions, such as by enacting
mandatory minimum sentences for first-time offenders, fails to achieve either
specific or general deterrence.23' One study examining the impact of sentence
length on specific deterrence (that is, on persons already convicted of an offense)
suggests that the most effective sentence in reducing recidivism is five to six
months; sentences that were either longer or shorter were less effective at
changing drivers' behavior. 32 There is also evidence that administrative
sanctions are more effective than increasing statutory penalties for drunk
driving.233 Research also shows that certainty-the second prong of deterrence
theory-plays a limited role in shaping driver behavior. Some early studies
found that law enforcement actions that increase the certainty of apprehension,
such as well-publicized road blocks and routine breathalyzer testing, do have a
234general deterrent impact. However, a recent study found no relationship
227 According to recent census data, the U.S. population grew from 281,421,906 in 2000 to
308,745,538 in 2010. 2010 Census Data, supra note 24.
228 Bertelli & Richardson, supra note 222, at 559.
229 Durna, supra note 120, at 87 (citing George A. Beitel et al., Probability of Arrest While Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol, 6 Inj. Prevention 158 (2000)).
230 See Bertelli & Richardson, supra note 222, at 545-50, 560-62.
231 See Ross, supra note 22, at 59-60 (reviewing many studies and noting that only one study-
which suffered from many methodological problems-found a specific deterrent effect on
offenders in response to a judicially-initiated policy of mandatory two-day jail sentences for all
first-time offenders, and that one study had many methodological problems); see Rodney F.
Kingsnorth et al., Specific Deterrence and the DUI Offender: The Impact of a Decade of Reform,
10 JUST. Q. 265, 279 (1993) (finding that increasingly severe sentences imposed by California law
for repeat drunk driving offenses did not reduce reconviction rates).
232 Michael Weinrath & John Gartrell, Specific Deterrence and Sentence Length: The Case of
Drunk Drivers, 17 J. CONTEMP CRIM. JUST. 105, 117-18 (2001).
233 See Anne T. McCartt & Veronika Shabanova Northrup, Effects of Enhanced Sanctions for High-
BAC DWI Offenders on Case Dispositions and Rates of Recidivism, 5 TRAFFIC ]NJ. PREVENTION
270, 276-77 (2004) (finding that administrative sanctions for high-BAC offenders reduced
recidivism rates).
234 See Ross, supra note 22, at 67-73. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of road
blocks and "sobriety checkpoints" to permit police to check drivers for symptoms of intoxication,
despite a lack of probable cause to believe that the driver was driving while impaired. Mich. Dep't
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). However, many state courts have found that such
interventions violate their state constitutions. See, e.g., R. Marc Kantrowitz et al., Validity of
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between the extent of law enforcement activity directed at drunk driving
(measured by arrest rates) and the incidence of crashes caused by drunk
driving.
35
A key to understanding the limited deterrent impact of strengthening law
enforcement efforts is the principle that the threat of arrest and conviction works
only with those offenders who are neither so opposed to drinking and driving that
they would never consider doing it, nor so "impulsive and pathologically present
oriented" that they would fail to take future costs into account in their decision-
making."' Many researchers now postulate a U-shaped curve of deterrence, with
only those drinkers in the middle-the "occasional sinners"--being likely to
respond to the marginal deterrence created by changes in sanctions or
enforcement policy. 237 These commentators assert that deterrence researchers
may overemphasize the role of certainty as a factor in shaping behavior by failing
to separate out those offenders who are in fact "deterrable" by changes in
criminal sanction from those who are not, thus erring when they include those
who are either "acutely conformist" or "incorrigible., 238  It is therefore not
surprising that "problem drinkers" with significant alcohol dependence are likely
to reoffend, despite the known risk of incarceration, either because they have a
diminished ability to rationally assess the risk of punishment 239 or because their
alcohol dependency causes them to seek immediate gratification (i.e., getting
drunk).240
The "sinner" model propounded by MADD and enacted by most state
legislatures has been strikingly ineffective with young drivers. Young adult
Police Roadblocks or Checkpoints for Purpose of Discovery of Alcoholic Intoxication-Post-Sitz
Cases, 74 A.L.R. 5th 319 (2004).
235 Chris S. Dula et al., Policing the Drunk Driver: Measuring Law Enforcement Involvement in
Reducing Alcohol-Impaired Driving, 38 J. SAFETY RES. 267, 269 (2007) (examining law
enforcement efforts in Tennessee).
236 Bertelli & Richardson, supra note 222, at 546. Thus, the fact that frequent drinkers (including
heavy drinkers) are likely to be well-informed about the drunk driving laws in their states, Duma,
supra note 120, at 35-36, tells us nothing about deterrence unless there are reasons that these
frequent drinkers will respond to the possibility of being stopped for drunk driving.
237 See Bertelli & Richardson, supra note 222, at 561; Pogarsky, supra note 189, at 435, 440-41,
444-46.
238 Pogarsky, supra note 189, at 435, 440-41, 444-46. Nonetheless, one study found that the
experience of seeing a sobriety checkpoint in the last year (equated with awareness of law
enforcement efforts, and by implication, the certainty of punishment) is positively correlated with
choosing not to drive while intoxicated but not with a decision whether to drive within two hours of
having had a drink. Duma, supra note 120, at 101, 116. Further, the same study found that
intoxicated drivers who had seen a sobriety checkpoint in the last year were also more likely to be a
passenger with an intoxicated driver. Id. at 105 (demonstrating the limitations of drawing a
conclusion about deterrence from only one measure).
239 Jiang Yu, Punishment and Alcohol Problems: Recidivism Among Drinking-Driving Offenders,
28 J. CRIM. JUST. 261, 262-67 (2000) (evaluating problem drinking by drivers' score on a standard
assessment of alcoholic impairment, the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test).
240 See GENE HEYMAN, ADDICTION: A DISORDER OF CHOICE 56-64, 82-86, 105-08, 117-22, 130
(2009) (suggesting a theory of "local" versus "global" choice making as a way to explain
addiction).
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drivers (between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-nine) are most likely to drink
and drive,24' and teenage drivers are the most likely to crash. 42 Despite the
nationwide enactment of "zero tolerance" laws, which prohibit drivers under
twenty-one from having any measurable alcohol in their systems,243 more than
one-third of all fatally-injured teen drivers in 2006 had a blood alcohol level that
exceeded .08 percent, the legal limit for adult drivers.244  Highly-publicized
programs that target teenage and college student drivers who drink, through
stepped-up enforcement of the prohibitions against driving under the influence
(DUI) and under-age liquor purchasing, have been shown to be successful in
reducing the incidence of DUI, both by teenage and older drivers. 24' However,
underage drivers with relatively low blood alcohol levels (less than 10 percent)
continue to have a high rate of recidivism, suggesting that current legislation (or
its enforcement) is insufficient to fully address the problem of alcohol-impaired
driving.246
As an alternative, it is important to consider other government and
private sector strategies to make it less likely that people will drink, drive, and
get into accidents.247 In order to continue to reduce the harms caused by drunk
driving, a three-pronged strategy is necessary: decreasing alcohol availability,
improving the safety of private transportation, and increasing access to public
248transportation. Options for reducing alcohol consumption include increasing
alcohol taxes, which would make it more expensive for consumers to consume
alcohol,249 and providing greater penalties to those who sell or give alcohol to
people likely to drive, such as by expanding dram shop25° and social host liability
in tort2 5' or by using strict liability in criminal law to dispense with the
241 Bertelli & Richardson, supra note 222, at 557.
242 McCartt & Northrup, supra note 135, at 29.
243 See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
244 McCartt et al., Effects, supra note 218, at 545.
245 Id. at 143-46; McCartt et al., Implementation, supra note 218, at 344-45.
246 McCartt et al., Implementation, supra note 218, at 345.
247 See Joseph Gusfeld, Foreword to H. LAURENCE Ross, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVING: SOCIAL
POLICY FOR SAVING LIVES ix, xi-xii (1992).
248 See Ross, supra note 22, at 3-4, 8-12, 52.
249 See id. at 90-96; William N. Evans et al., General Deterrence of Drunk Driving: Evaluation of
Recent American Policies, 11 RISK ANALYSIS 279, 285 (1991) (finding that increases in the price of
alcohol may affect the rate of alcohol-related fatalities).
250 See Ross, supra note 22. at 107-08. Dram shop liability, which holds those who sell liquor to
obviously intoxicated persons liable for the harms caused if they subsequently drive while
intoxicated, has been shown to reduce collisions and fatalities attributable to drunk driving.
MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, DRAM SHOP AND SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY 1 (2011), available
at http://www.madd.org/laws/law-overview/DramShopOverview.pdf. Today, more than 40
states have such laws. Id.
251 See Angela K. Dills, Social Host Liability for Minors and Underage Drunk-Driving Accidents,
29 J. HEALTH ECON. 241, 247 (2010). Laws that impose civil liability on those who furnish liquor
to minors knowing that they are likely to drive thereafter have been found to reduce drunk driving
fatalities among underage drinkers by five to nine percent. Id. This is a significant
accomplishment, compared to the ten percent reduction achieved by raising the minimum drinking
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requirement of mens rea.252 To achieve the goal of making private transportation
safer, cars must be designed to be more crash-resistant, emergency services must
be improved and expanded, law enforcement must emphasize primary, rather
than secondary enforcement of seat belt and other restraint laws, and roads must
be made safer.253 Another effective means of making private transportation safer
is to require alcohol-impaired drivers to install breath alcohol ignition interlocks
in their cars as a condition of driving while their licenses are suspended or as a
condition of license restoration;254 however, only fifteen states currently require
this for all offenders. 255 Finally, public transportation must be made both more
affordable and more available, for example, by increasing bus and taxi service
linking areas with heavy concentrations of bars to densely populated residential
256
areas, as is currently done on many college campuses.
C. Seat Belt Laws
Mandatory seat belt laws have been a major factor in reducing injuries
and fatalities related to motor vehicle accidents. Since 1968, when the
Congressional mandate that all new cars sold in the United States be equipped
with seat belts went into effect,25 7  injuries and fatalities have fallen
significantly.258 It is estimated that wearing a seat belt reduces the chance of
age to twenty-one and the three percent reduction accomplished by reducing the maximum
permissible blood alcohol level to .08. Currently, twenty-seven states have such laws. Underage
Drinking: Prohibitions Against Hosting Underage Drinking Parties, ALCOHOL POLICY
INFORMATION SYSTEM, http://www.alcoholpolicy.niaaa.nih.gov/prohibitions-against hosting_
underagedrinkingparties.html?tab=maps (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). Nineteen states impose
such liability as part of a broader social host liability law, and eight states have laws specifically
directed at serving liquor to minors. Id.
252 See Richard Singer, Strict Criminal Liability: Alabama State Courts Lead the Way into the
Twenty-First Century, 46 ALA. L. REV. 47, 56-58 (1994) (discussing court cases applying strict
liability to the sale of alcohol to minors).
253 See Ross, supra note 22, at 140-66.
254 MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, IGNITION INTERLOCKS: EVERY STATE, FOR EVERY
CONVICTED DRIVER 1 (2012), available at http://www.madd.org/laws/law-overview/Draft-
IgnitionInterlocksOverview.pdf.
255 Id. at 1-2; see also Daniel Wise, Drunken Drivers Must Install Devices to Monitor Alcohol Use,
N.Y. L.J., Jul 23, 2010; DUI/DWI Laws, supra note 206; State Ignition Interlock Laws, NAT'L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS, http://ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid = 13558 (last updated May 2012).
256 See Ross, supra note 22, at 119-26. Allegheny College provides a free bus service to its
students. See The Loop, CRAWFORD AREA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (CATA),
http://catabus.org/wp/bus-schedules-and-maps/the-loop/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
257 This mandate was accomplished by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (repealed 1994), and the Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 401-412).
258 See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: EARLY ESTIMATE OF
MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES IN 2008 1 (2009) (demonstrating that the national fatality rate
per 100 million vehicle miles traveled (100 M VMT) has fallen from its peak of over five fatalities
per 100 M VMT in the 1960s to approximately 1.28 in 2008, an over 400 percent decrease); see
also LONGTHORNE ET AL., supra note 18, at 1-2 (summarizing the trend in the total number of
annual fatalities from 1990 to 2008, which has been generally downward with an occasional
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death by forty-five percent and the risk of serious injury by fifty percent for
drivers and front seat passengers in a car.259 All fifty states and the District of
Columbia currently require children to use seat belts; forty-nine states plus the
District of Columbia require adult drivers and passengers to do so, at least if they
are in the front seat. 6°  However, nineteen states have just secondary
enforcement laws, which permit law enforcement officers to cite drivers for a
seat belt violation only if they stop the driver for another motor vehicle
261
offense. In states where there is primary enforcement of seat belt laws,
observed compliance with the laws is more than ten percent higher262 because it
is easier for an arresting officer to identify the offending conduct, thus increasing
the certainty of apprehension. 63 Fatality rates are also significantly lower in
states with primary rather than secondary enforcement of seat belt laws,264 a
phenomenon that is notable because it holds true whether the state initially
adopted a primary enforcement statute or subsequently upgraded from a
secondary to a primary enforcement law.265 A recent study found that states that
increased the fines for violating seat belt laws had significantly higher rates of
seat belt use than states that did not increase their fines.266 Current fines are very
low, averaging between $25 and $30 across the nation.267 Canadian research
suggests that compliance with mandatory seat belt laws increases when provinces
impose license penalty points on drivers who violate the law because of concern
that their insurance costs will increase as a consequence.268 Sixteen states have
upward bump). It is estimated that in 2008 wearing a seatbelt saved the lives of 13,250 people over
age five. LONGTHORNE ET AL., supra note 18, at 1-2. Interestingly, fatality numbers also fell in
times of economic downturn, perhaps because people were less likely to drive when they did not
have enough money. Id.
259 NAT'L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, supra note 122, at 4. Drivers and passengers in
SUVs, pick-up trucks, and vans have a sixty percent survival rate if they are wearing a seat belt,
presumably because these vehicles are generally larger and heavier. See McCartt & Northrup,
supra note 135, at 36.
260 Safety Belt and Child Restraint Laws, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY (Sept. 2012),
http://www.iihs.org/laws/SafetyBeltUse.aspx. New Hampshire is the only state with no mandatory
seat belt law for adults. Id.
261 NAT'L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, supra note 122, at 6.
262 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: SEATBELT USE IN 2010-
OVERALL RESULTS 1 (2010), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811378.pdf.
263 David J. Houston & Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., Reducing Traffic Fatalities in the American
States by Upgrading Seat Belt Use Laws to Primary Enforcement, 25 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
645, 656 (2006).
264 CEJUN LIu ET AL., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: STATES
WITH PRIMARY ENFORCEMENT LAWS HAVE LOWER FATALITY RATES 1 (2006) (finding that from
2000 to 2004 states with primary enforcement seat belt laws had a fatality rate of 1.03 fatalities per
100 million vehicle miles traveled (100 M VMT) while states with secondary enforcement laws had
a fatality rate of 1.21 per 100 M VMT).
265 See Houston & Richardson, supra note 263, at 651-656.
266 JAMES L. NICHOLS ET AL., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., STRATEGIES TO INCREASE
SEAT BELT USE: AN ANALYSIS OF LEVELS OF FINES AND THE TYPE OF LAW 36-37 (2010), available
at www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/occupantprotection/pdf/811413 .pdf.
217 Id. at 10.
268 See id. at 12.
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created tort consequences for violation of their seat belt laws by enacting the so-
called "safety belt defense," which means that those who are injured in a motor
vehicle accident may collect reduced damages for injuries they would not have
suffered if they were wearing a seat belt.269
Seat belt and child safety seat laws are particularly important for children
and adolescents. Motor vehicle accidents are the leading cause of death among
Americans ages two to thirty-four.27° Teenagers, who have the highest motor
vehicle accident and fatality rate of all drivers,27' also have the lowest rate of seat
belt use, particularly when there are other teenagers in the car.272 This is
consistent with their general propensity toward risk-taking and their sensitivity to
peer pressure.273 Younger children are much more likely to survive a crash and
have less serious injuries if they are in an age-appropriate infant or child booster
seat,274 but many states' laws require children to be restrained only if they are in
the front seat.275
In rare cases prosecutors have brought criminal charges against parents
who failed to secure their child in a seat belt or other appropriate restraint. In
1991 an immigrant father in Florida was charged with vehicular manslaughter
after he and his wife failed to put their three-year-old child in a safety seat and
the child was killed in a collision.276 The previous year, a California man was
charged in similar circumstances, although the charges against him were
ultimately dropped.277 In both cases prosecutors announced that they wanted to
269 Safety Belt and Child Restraint Laws, supra note 260.
270 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADM1N., 2006 MOTOR VEHICLE OCCUPANT PROTECTION
FACTS: CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND YOUNG ADULTS 2 (2008), available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/Traffic%2Injury/2OContro/Articles/Associated%2OFiles/81
0654.pdf.
271 VERMETTE, supra note 7, at 10, 22.
212 A.F. Williams et al., Seatbelt Use by High School Students, 9 INJ. PREVENTION 25, 26-28 (2003).
The high accident and fatality rates and the low rate of seat belt use converge, with teenage drivers
involved in fatal accidents being particularly unlikely to have been wearing their seat belts. See
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIm., supra note 270, at 14 (showing that from 1997 to 2006,
sixty percent or more of drivers sixteen to twenty years old who were killed in accidents were not
wearing seat belts; seventy-seven percent of the teenage drivers involved in fatalities who had been
drinking were not wearing a seat belt); McCartt & Northrup, supra note 135, at 29, 31-32 (finding a
seat belt use rate of thirty percent for male teenagers involved in fatal accidents and forty-nine
percent for female teens).
3 See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
274 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 270, at 6-8.
275 Safety Belt and Child Restraint Laws, supra note 260.
276 Rick Bragg & Susan Benesch, A Question of Guilt, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Apr. 28,
1991, at Al; see also Jill Ross, Prosecution is Dilemma in Child-Restraint Violations, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), March 4, 1991, at B 1 (citing multiple cases in which the driver was
charged only with a moving violation and paid a fine of less than $100.00). Another Florida man
was also charged with driving under the influence of alcohol manslaughter for failing to
appropriately restrain a child. Ross, supra.
277 Bragg & Benesch, supra note 276; Editorial, Endangering Kids, S.F. CHRoN., Jan. 2, 1991, at
A18.
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send a message that child restraint rules were important laws that must be
obeyed.278 Media coverage of the Florida case suggested that some felt that the
parents charged were being scapegoated because they were poor immigrants or
that criminal proceedings were unnecessary because the parents had already
suffered enough from the loss of their child.279 In the Florida case, the judge
ruled after a bench trial that the prosecution had failed to prove the elements of
its case, hinting at prosecutorial overreaching.280 On the other hand, as a result of
the prosecution, the Florida legislature increased the penalty for failing to use a
child safety seat from $37 to $150, a hefty sum in 1991, and the State's Attorney
for Dade County, Janet Reno, announced that she would establish a school to
educate all parents cited for violating the law, both efforts to increase the law's
deterrent impact.28'
D. Laws Mandating Motor Cycle Helmets
Riding a motorcycle is so dangerous that one analyst provocatively titled
his article, Why ER's Call Them Donor-Cycles.282 Wearing a safety helmet
dramatically reduces the likelihood of death and serious injury for motorcycle
riders who crash. 83 Yet while the federal and state governments have generally
embraced laws requiring the use of seat belts and other safety restraints,
particularly for children, only nineteen states and the District of Columbia
currently require all motorcycle drivers and passengers to wear a helmet.
284
Twenty-eight states have enacted "partial helmet laws," which require certain
categories of motorcycle riders to wear a helmet, and three states have no helmet
requirements at all.285 Anything less than a universal helmet law is difficult to
278 See Bragg & Benesch, supra note 276; Ross, supra note 276 (quoting prosecutors who state that
criminal charges are necessary "to send a message that drivers should be held responsible for the
safety of children in their care").
279 Bragg & Benesch, supra note 276.
280 Tim Golden, Father Cleared in Child's Death in Car Seat Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1991, at 1.
281 Id.
282 Dennis McCarty, Why ER's Call Them Donor-Cycles, THE REPUBLIC (Columbus, Ind.), May 7,
2006.
283 See LONGTHORNE ET AL., supra note 18, at 2 (noting the estimate by the NHTSA that in 2008
1829 lives were saved by the use of motorcycle helmets); NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: MOTORCYCLES 6 (2009), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pubs/811159.pdf (noting that helmets are thirty-seven percent effective in
preventing fatal injuries to motorcycle riders and forty-one percent effective in preventing fatal
injuries to motorcycle passengers); NAT'L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, MOTORCYCLE
SAFETY: HOW TO SAVE LIVES AND SAVE MONEY 9 (2012), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/pdf/mc20l2/MotorcycleSafetyBook.pdf (noting that
motorcycle riders without helmets are twice as likely as helmet-wearers to suffer a traumatic brain
injury).
284 Motorcycle Crash-Related Data, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/Features/dsMotorcycleSafety/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
285 Id.; see also NAT'L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, supra note 283, at 15 (noting that the
categories covered by partial helmet laws include drivers under a certain age (17-20), novice
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enforce because police officers cannot tell at a glance whether the non-helmeted
rider is within an exempt category, and thus citations for helmet violations are
generally given only in conjunction with another traffic violation.286 States that
have mandatory helmet laws have much higher helmet use rates (generally over
eighty percent) than states that do not, and, as a result, much lower motorcycle
death and injury rates.287
In contrast to Congress' consistent efforts to improve highway safety
through the provision of incentives and penalties for states to enact mandatory
seat belt and child restraint laws and numerous measures to combat drunk
driving,288 Congress has vacillated in its concern over motorcycle helmet safety.
Congress has twice offered states financial incentives to enact strong mandatory
helmet laws and twice backed off from its support.289 While states have
generally responded strongly to those incentives, when Congressional support for
motorcycle helmet laws waned, many states caved in to pressure from
motorcycle rider groups asserting libertarian arguments.290  When Congress
enacted the Highway Safety Act of 1966, it authorized the Secretary of
Transportation to set uniform standards for state highway safety programs,
including mandatory helmet laws.2 9 1 As a result, by 1975 nearly all states had
adopted mandatory helmet laws.292 In 1975, just when the Secretary of
drivers, those who are passengers of riders who must be helmeted, and drivers without health
insurance coverage).286 NAT'L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, supra note 283, at 15.
287 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: MOTORCYCLE HELMET USE
IN 2009--OVERALL RESULTS 1-2 (2009), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/
Pubs/811254.PDF. Numerous studies have found that when states enact mandatory helmet laws
many more riders use helmets than when such use is optional; conversely, when states have
repealed their mandatory helmet laws, there have been dramatic declines in the rate of helmet use.
See NAT'L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, supra note 283, at 13; U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF.,
HIGHWAY SAFETY: MOTORCYCLE HELMET LAWS SAVE LIVES AND REDUCE COSTS TO SOCIETY 4
(1991), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/150870.pdf.
288 See supra notes 120 and 258 and accompanying text; LONGTHORNE ET AL., supra note 18, at 14
(presenting chart summarizing federally encouraged highway safety milestones).
9 See infra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
290 See Marian Moser Jones & Ron Bayer, Paternalism and Its Discontents: Motorcycle Helmet
Laws, Libertarian Values, and Public Health, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 208, 210-13 (2007). A
number of motorcyclist advocacy groups were formed to fight mandatory helmet laws. Id.
Constitutional challenges to mandatory helmet laws have been rejected by nearly all courts, which
have upheld the states' police power argument that the states' concern with protecting the lives of
motorcycle passengers and other motorists, as well as in minimizing state funds to pay for the high
health care costs of uninsured motorcyclists, trumps any autonomy interest an individual driver
might have in not wearing a helmet. Id. However, two state appellate courts have upheld such
challenges, finding that individual liberty and privacy interests trumped the state's interest in public
safety and injury reduction. Id. at 210-11 & nn.17-25. The two cases in which the court held the
statutes to be unconstitutional were People v. Fries, 250 N.E.2d 249 (I1. 1969) and Am. Motorcycle
Ass'n vDep't of State Police, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. App. 1968).
291 Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731.
292 HOPE GILBERT ET AL., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., EVALUATION OF THE
REINSTATEMENT OF THE HELMET LAW IN LOUISIANA 3 (2008), available at
http://www.google.con/search?client-safari&rls=en&q=evaluation+of+the+reinstatement+of+the+
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Transportation was about to withhold highway construction funds from
California, Illinois, and Utah for failing to enact helmet laws, Congress amended
the Highway Safety Act to eliminate this as a requirement for receiving federal
funds.293 As a result, many states repealed their laws.294 In 1991 Congress again
offered financial incentives to states to enact laws to promote highway safety,
providing incentive grants to states that enacted both mandatory helmet laws and
295mandatory seat belt laws; st,.:tes responded positively to those incentives .
However, in 1995 the newly-elected Newt Gingrich Congress removed any
financial incentives for states to require all motorcyclists to wear helmets, and
several states eliminated their mandatory helmet laws, a trend which has
296
continued to the present.
4
E. The Impact of Tort Litigation in Changing Driver Behavior
In the early twentieth century, with the advent of the automobile and
"horseless trolleys," an "epidemic" of motor vehicle fatalities claimed the lives of
thousands of American children. 97  Although initially these victims were
primarily poor, urban tenement dwellers, whose parents were often blamed for
failing to supervise their children, public and media attitudes shifted when middle
and upper class children began to be killed.298 As pro-plaintiff jury verdicts
29became larger and more common,   liability insurers for motorists and
transportation companies became actively involved in improving transportation
safety, primarily by promoting the establishment of public playgrounds and by
supporting the formation of school safety patrols. °0
helmet+law+in+louisiana&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8; ROBERT G. ULMER & VERONIKA SHABANOVA
NORTHRUP, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., EVALUATION OF THE REPEAL OF THE ALL-
RIDER MOTORCYCLE HELMET LAW IN FLORIDA 1 (2005), available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/pedbimot/motorcycle/flamcreport/images/FloridaMCReportser
. df.
GILBERT ET AL., supra note 292, at 3.
294 Id. at 5; see also ULMER & NORTHRUP, supra note 292, at 2; Ogolla & Shaw, supr&',ote 120, at
13.
295 See Intermodal Surface Transportation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-241, 105 Stat. 1914;
GILBERT ET AL., supra note 292, at 4.
296 GILBERT, supra note 292, at 5; NAT'L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, supra note 283, at
13; ULMER & NORTHRUP, supra note 292, at 2.
297 ZELIZER, supra note 70, at 32-33.
298 Id. at 46-47.
'99 Id. at 44-45.
3
. Id. at 51-52.
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F. Implications of Deterrence Research for Changing Drivers' Use of Cell
Phones
1. General Deterrence Principles
As noted earlier, the essence of deterrence is that it is perceptual.01 In
order for a law to affect people's behavior, they must be aware of it.30 2 This
general rule has five specific corollaries.0 3 The first relates to the marginal
deterrent effect of a new law or policy: "[a] potential offender must realise that
the probability of conviction or the severity of punishment has changed.
304
When applied to motorists who might consider using their cell phone while
driving, this means first that they must be made aware of the change in the law or
enforcement policy. Cell phone bans or restrictions can affect behavior only if
people believe that it is more likely that they will be apprehended (increased
certainty of punishment) or that they will suffer a more severe consequence if
they are apprehended (increased severity of punishment), such as an increased
fine, driver's license points or suspension, or possibly heftier insurance
premiums.
As a threshold matter, data suggest not only that Americans fail to take
into account the possibility of punishment for violating cell phone bans, but also
that many do not actually believe the conduct is risky-at least not for them.
Even though most Americans are aware of laws banning the use of hand-held cell
phones while driving, many disregard them. 305 At any moment, five to six
percent of motorists are using a cell phone while driving, 306 and in a recent
survey, forty percent of drivers acknowledged using a cell phone several times a
week, with the rates for teens even higher.30 7 Drivers appear to have a cognitive
split about cell phone use while driving: at the same time as they express concern
about others who engage in this behavior, they discount their own risk of
accident, claiming that they have "used [their] cell phone dozens of times and
301 See VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 188, at 1.
302 See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
303 See VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 188, at 7.
304 Id. (emphasis omitted).
305 Cf COSGROVE ET AL., FOUR HIGH VISIBILITY ENFORCEMENT WAVES, supra note 95, at 7-10
(finding that nine out of ten drivers in Connecticut and New York state knew about their states'
handheld cell phone ban, but three out of ten expected to be cited for violating it); Braitman &
McCartt, supra note 29, at 54546 (finding that "[f]requency of driver phone use of any type was
higher in states with all-driver bans," with twenty-two percent of drivers in non-ban states reporting
daily phone use while driving compared to thirteen percent of drivers in states with an all-driver
handheld cell phone ban; however, the same study found that "[t]here was no significant
relationship between state law and frequency of texting while driving among all drivers or among
any of the age groups.").
306 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 28, at 1.
307 Braitman & McCartt, supra note 29, at 544-46.
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[they have] never been in a wreck., 308 A recent study of drivers in New York
and Connecticut-states that have long-standing bans on using hand-held cell
phones while driving-found that although almost ninety percent of drivers
surveyed supported the enforcement of these laws, seven to nine percent admitted
that they themselves had used a cell phone while driving, and no more than a
third thought it was likely that they would receive a ticket for violating the law.309
At the same time, this study also showed that an intensive and highly-
visible local law enforcement program had some impact on the observed
incidence of hand-held phone use on New York and Connecticut roads. 0
Because the statutory penalties did not change, only the likelihood of
apprehension, this finding is consistent with with the general principle of
deterrence that certainty of apprehension and conviction has a greater impact
than the severity of sanction imposed.311 This is also consistent with the third
corollary of the principle of deterrence, that "[a] potential offender must believe
that there is a non-negligible likelihood of being caught .... [S]anctions for
prohibitions thought to be poorly enforced are likely to have only a small
deterrent impact.
312
However, other stepped-up enforcement efforts have not been effective
with drivers under age twenty-five,313 which is the group most likely both to have
car crashes314 and to engage in risky behavior,315 including driving while
texting.316 This is consistent with the second deterrence corollary, that for a law
or law enforcement policy to have a deterrent effect, "[a] potential offender must
take these altered risks into account when deciding whether to offend ... [and
not] act impulsively, or under the influence of drugs or alcohol ... It is the
essence of adolescence to be highly impulsive, easily influenced by peer
pressure, and inclined to disregard the future consequences of their actions;
3 18
308 Stone, supra note 53 (recounting California Highway Patrol officer's description of drivers'
excuse for violating the law: "They say, 'I've used my cell phone dozens of times, and I've never
been involved in a wreck."').
309 COSGROVE ET AL., FouR HIGH VISIBILITY ENFORCEMENT DEMONSTRATION WAVES, supra note
95, at 7-8, 10.
310 Id. at 7-9; see also supra note 94 (discussing similar findings in studies of drivers in the United
Kingdom).311 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
312 VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 188, at 7.
313 See COSGROVE ET AL., HIGH VISIBILITY ENFORCEMENT DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS, supra note
95, at 4-5 (finding that reductions in observed hand-held cell phone use in New York and
Connecticut attributed to those states' high visibility enforcement programs were significant only
among drivers twenty-five to fifty-nine); see also McCartt & Northrup, supra note 233, at 275
(finding that enhanced sanctions for high-BAC DWI offenders were least effective at reducing
recidivism rates among offenders under twenty-five).314 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
3 5 See Slomski, supra note 131, at 3.
316 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
317 VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 201, at 7 (internal citation omitted).
318 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402-05 (2011); Slomski, supra note 131, at 3.
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therefore, one would not expect teens and younger adults to respond as readily as
older drivers to the deterrent influence of a ban on cell phone use.3 19 This is
borne out by numerous studies of teen driving, which show that teens are both
more likely to text than other drivers320 and more likely to crash when there are
other teens in the car.321
Other research raises doubts about the efficacy of laws attempting to
regulate cell phone use. A 2009 study that examined collision claims in
California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and New York, all of which
ban hand-held cell phone use while driving, found that even though the rate of
observed cell phone use fell in those states, there was no corresponding decline in
collision claim rates.322 This suggests either that researchers did not observe all
cell phone use, as drivers became adept at hiding their cell phone-related
behavior, or that the use of hands-free cell phones was not as safe as legislators
had anticipated. A 2010 study produced similar but even more striking results.
The studyffound that not only did recently-enacted bans on texting while driving
in California, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Washington state not reduce collision
rates in t4ose states, but they were in fact associated with increased collision
rates, particularly among drivers under age twenty-five.323 The study's authors
hypothesized that drivers were more likely to hide their activities from law
enforcement as a result of the texting ban, and this meant spending more time
looking away from the road, thereby increasing the odds of having an accident.32 4
This finding accords with the fifth deterrence corollary, that
[a] potential offender must be willing to alter his or her choices
regarding offending in the light of the perceived change in certainty...
of punishment.... If the criminal activity is of sufficient importance in
the potential offender's life because of the resources or life-style it
provides or the needs it fulfills, then enhanced certainty or severity of
punishment may not make him desist.3
25
A strong argument can be made that talking and texting on cell phones is such a
lifestyle choice. For teenagers and many adults, being connected is essential,
whether it is the instant connectedness of MySpace or Facebook or the slightly
more distant phone or Blackberry connection that employees have with their
319 See Bushway & Reuter, supra note 196, at 405 (finding that those "who discount the future
more heavily are less likely to be deterred by a given punishment.").320 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
321 See McCartt et al., supra note 46, at 246 (noting that teen drivers are more likely to be involved
in fatal accidents when they are carrying teen passengers).
322 HIGHWAY Loss DATA INST., supra note 101, at 5.
323 Id. at 8. "
324 See id. at 8.
325VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 188, at 7.
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employers and that parents have with their children.326 This means that, for many
people, the need they feel to be immediately available to anyone who might want
to contact them 327 will trump the very slight possibility that they could be cited
for a minor motor vehicle offense and fined no more than $100 for a first
offense.328
2. Deterrence in the Motor Vehicle Context
Lessons from other aspects of motor vehicle regulation illuminate the
potential and limitations of using law to change behavior in a way that actually
affects human safety. Federal involvement in highway safety has been effective
in two ways: (1) directly mandating new safety equipment; 329 and (2)
incentivizing states to make the use of safety equipment mandatory or to change
the law to make it easier to apprehend and prosecute drivers engaged in
dangerous behavior.30  For example, federal law has consistently encouraged
states to enact laws mandating seat belt use; today every state except New
331Hampshire has enacted a mandatory seat belt law for all front seat passengers.
In contrast, Congress has been highly inconsistent in its support of mandatory
motorcycle helmet laws, and as a result only twenty states and the District of
Columbia currently mandate that all motorcycle riders wear helmets.332
Seat belt and motorcycle helmet laws also demonstrate the importance of
making the desired behavior the object of primary enforcement, so that any law
enforcement officer who observes the prohibited behavior can immediately
detain and cite the driver. Compliance with seat belt laws is higher in states with
primary enforcement than in states with secondary enforcement; in addition,
states that have primary enforcement of these laws have substantially lower
fatality rates.33 3 In contrast, motorcycle helmet use is dramatically lower-and
326 See Erich Schwartzel, Staying Connected a Status (Update) Symbol, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Jan. 6, 2010, at Al.
327 Although few people are truly "addicted" to their communications technology, many Americans
display a significant dependence on it. See Anick Jesdanum, Study: Americans More Dependent on
Cell Phones, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 5, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/wireless/phones/2008-
03-05-cellphone-studyN.htm (citing new study by Pew Internet and American Life Project
finding, among other things, that thirty-six percent of Americans surveyed said they would have
difficulty giving up access to email via their cell phone).
328 See Drivers Ed: Cell Phones and Driving-A Dangerous Combination, COMPARISONMARKET,
http://www.comparisonmarket.com/learningcenter/articledetail.aspx/index/458 (last visited Aug.
30, 2012) (stating the fines for New York, Connecticut, and Washington, D.C., which impose fines
beginning at $100 and rise significantly for second and third offenses).
329 See supra notes 258 and accompanying text (discussing improvements in driver safety following
the Congressional mandate that all new cars be equipped with seat belts).
330 See supra notes 120, 215-19 (discussing federal incentives to create a national minimum
drinking age and set the blood alcohol limit at .08).
331 See supra Part III.C.
332 See supra Part III.D.
333 See supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
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fatality rates are significantly higher-in states that do not have mandatory
helmet laws for all riders.334
Federal support of state laws to reduce the incidence of drunk driving has
been remarkably successful. Beginning in 1984, Congress has provided
significant and consistent financial incentives for states to raise the minimum
drinking age to twenty-one, change the definition of drunk driving to make
driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 per se a crime, and enact zero tolerance
laws for drivers under age twenty-one.335 Of course, the federal government's
campaign against drunk driving coincided with private advocacy; together they
achieved intensive and persistent media coverage of this issue, which over time
led to a shift in widely-held social norms. 336 This is consistent with the core
principle of deterrence that people will be more likely to refrain from certain
behavior if they perceive that it has negative consequences, not only as a
Benthamite act of rational calculation, but also in response to the criminal law's
ability to define social boundaries and change community norms.337 Researchers
have suggested that such a normative shift is a major reason why drunk driving
fatalities have stayed relatively low after the initial period of dramatic decline in
the early 1980s to the mid 1990s, as many more people either drink less when
they go out, choose a designated driver, or arrange for alternative
transportation.338 Simultaneously, though, the apparent inability of either legal or
normative pressures to further reduce the death toll from drunk driving
demonstrates the limits of deterrence. If, as posited by Pogarsky and other social
scientists, deterrence follows a U-shaped curve, then there may be some drivers
who fall outside the law's coercive (or persuasive) power to change behavior.339
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: HOW TO RESPOND TO DISTRACTED
DRIVING IN AN AGE OF CONNECTION
In order to achieve meaningful change in the use of cell phones while
driving, it is important to use a multi-pronged strategy, using criminal and civil
laws, education, and financial incentives to change behavior. In designing that
strategy, it is paramount to keep in mind the long-term goal of changing drivers'
cell phone behavior: decreasing the number of accidents attributable to cell
phone use and the fatalities and injuries that accompany them. All proposals for
legal and other change must be evaluated through this lens.
334 NAT'L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, supra note 283, at 13, 17. After Florida repealed
its motorcycle helmet law in 2000, motorcycle fatalities increased by seventy-one percent,
compared to a thirty-seven percent increase on a national level (reflecting national trends toward
more motorcycle registrations). ULMER & NORTHRUP, supra note 292, at iii, vii, 9.
335 See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
336 See supra text accompanying notes 207-14.
337 See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
338 Duma, supra note 120, at 114-18.
339 See Pogarsky, supra note 189, at 440-41,444-46; see also supra notes 252-56.
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The first step in changing Americans' use of cell phones while driving is
to modify their attitudes about the risks of that use. Americans, along with
government policymakers, must be educated about the real and imagined risks of
cell phone use. All cell phone conversations while driving modestly increase the
risk of motor vehicle accidents due to the driver's cognitive and auditory
distraction.340 Conversing in and of itself carries only a minor risk, but
physically manipulating a mobile device-by dialing, answering, or texting-
adds biomechanical and visual distraction and increases the risk of accident.341
Texting dramatically elevates the odds of having a crash or "near-crash" event.342
According to one widely-cited study, texting while driving is more than twenty-
three times riskier than driving without any distractions.343 Thus, it probably
makes sense to prohibit texting while driving, despite the results of a recent study
that found an increase in collision rates in states that had enacted texting bans,
suggesting that drivers who tried to avoid detection of their texting spent more
time looking away from the road than they would have if the activity was not
illegal.34
In contrast, banning all use of hand-held devices is not likely to yield any
real improvement in highway safety, particularly if the law simultaneously
permits the use of hands-free devices. This is because the largest portion of the
time using a mobile device is spent talking, rather than answering or dialing, and
talking is equally distracting whether one uses a hands-free or hand-held
device.345 While data from naturalistic studies as well as simulators show a
slightly elevated risk of accidents while talking on a mobile device,34 many
people participate in such conversations without incident. This is likely because
most people (but not teens) avoid using mobile devices when they are driving on
dangerous or congested highways, etc., just as people turn off the radio or stop
drinking or eating when facing challenging road conditions. 347 Laws that prohibit
the use of hand-held devices (while permitting the use of hands-free devices)
may have the unintended effect of encouraging more frequent and lengthier use
of the latter devices, potentially increasing the risk of accidents due to driver
distraction.348
340 See New Data from VTTI, supra note 35.
341 See supra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
342 See HICKMAN ET AL., supra note 40, at xiv.
343 Id. (examining the behavior of commercial motor vehicle drivers).
344 HIGHWAY Loss DATA INST., supra note 19, at 8.
345 See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
346 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.347 Cf Slomski, supra note 131, at 26-31 (noting that teenagers are less able to recognize the
riskiness of particular behaviors and difficult driving situations).
348 Hahn & Dudley, supra note 15, at 166-67 (arguing that "[b]y banning only hand-held units,
lawmakers may send consumers the wrong message; people may believe that hands-free devices
are safe and use them more often, or with less caution. This would increase risk associated with
hands-free units and may offset or even eclipse gains in safety from banning hand-held phones.")
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If, however, legislators decide that it is appropriate to ban all mobile
device use, the chance of apprehension needs to be high in order for such a ban to
be effective. As shown with other motor safety interventions, compliance with
the law increases and fatality rates decrease when there is primary enforcement
of the law, permitting law enforcement officers to intervene immediately when
they see a violation rather than waiting for another motor vehicle law to be
broken. 49 Increasing the sanction's severity is less effective than enhancing the
certainty of apprehension. 350 However, studies of drunk drivers and seat belt use
both suggest that a mid-range sanction is more effective than either a high or low
penalty in reducing recidivism. 31  Survey data about seat belt use suggest that
Americans would be open to a moderate increase in the penalties for violation.352
Deterrence research has shown that the law is most effective in achieving
behavioral change when it both promotes, and reflects, a larger normative shift.353
Thus, in order to make it more likely that Americans will give up their cherished
cell phones, at least while driving, it is important to align legal and financial
incentives and couple them with educational efforts to achieve a long-term
change in community values, such as the recently developed ad campaign
directed at "chang[ing] the culture" of mobile device use.354 At a minimum,
criminal law, motor vehicle safety law, and tort law should be made congruent.
Federal law should provide carrots and sticks in the form of financial incentives
and penalties connected with the receipt of federal highway money to encourage
states to enact bans on cell phone use that are supported by scientific data rather
than moralistic rhetoric or media hype.
When state laws are changed to ban mobile device use and/or texting,
they should also explicitly state that the behavior is negligence per se. This
would give both individual drivers and employers greater financial incentives to
comply with the ban in a way that the relatively minor fines of current motor
vehicle laws do not. As happened with traffic safety in the early twentieth
century, when insurance companies begin to feel the sting of large jury verdicts
in the case of driver negligence, they will put more effort into addressing the
problem.355 This could mean that insurers would revise their premium structure
349 See supra notes 262-65, 287 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of primary and
secondary enforcement of laws governing seat belts and motorcycle helmets). Currently eight
states and the District of Columbia have primary enforcement of their bans on hand-held cell
phones while driving, and thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have primary enforcement
of their bans on texting. See Cell Phone and Texting Laws, supra note 74.
350 See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
351 See NICHOLS ET AL. supra note 266, at 37 (studying seat belt fines); Weinrath & Gartrell, supra
note 232, at 117-18 (examining DWI penalties).
352 See NICHOLS ET AL., supra note 266, at 12-13.
353 See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
354 Copeland, supra note 6 (discussing recent ad campaign mounted by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, several states' attorneys general, and the Ad Council).
355 See Zelizer, supra note 70, at 38-42, 44-45, 49-52. Here it is important to remember that
insurers did not apparently focus on changing the behavior of motorists but instead worked to
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to reward employers who develop and enforce company-wide policies against the
use of mobile devices while driving, which would reduce employers' liability and
health care costs. Similarly, insurers might reward individual drivers who take
"safe driving" courses that address the dangers of mobile device use. Insurers
might also provide premium incentives to drivers who install equipment that
would disable their device while driving, just as they now reward drivers who
install "Lojack" devices to make it easier to find stolen cars.356 In addition,
insurers, with or without government support, should work to change drivers'
mobile device habits by lobbying for highways to be redesigned with frequent
pull-offs where drivers can call and text.
Any strategy to reduce mobile use while driving must begin with
teenagers, for two reasons. The first is obvious: teens have the highest risk for
dangerous driving in general (and are thus responsible for a disproportionately
large share of auto accidents, fatalities, and injuries),357 and are also more
susceptible to peer pressure.358 If the norms of their peer group can be changed
through education and incentives, it is likely that mobile device-related fatalities
and injuries will begin to decrease. 35 9 Second, teens will quickly age into young
adults, and then older adults, providing a unique opportunity for the moral
educative function of criminal and tort law to begin to take hold. A similar
development has occurred with drunk driving; it is now normative for those
anticipating an evening of social drinking to choose a designated driver or to plan
alternative transportation home.36°
A variety of strategies to change mobile device behavior are possible.
They include educating teens and their parents about the dangers of using cell
phones while driving (both individually and through community-wide education
and law enforcement programs), restricting teens from driving with teen
passengers, improving graduated licensing programs to give teens more
supervised experience driving under challenging road conditions, and providing
financial incentives (through insurance premium differentials) to teens who can
show safe (and cell-phone free) driving records. 361 Mandating an expansion of
educate accident victims-urban children-to be more attentive to traffic risks. Insurers did,
however, spend money to remove potential victims from the zone of harm by promoting the
development of urban playgrounds. Id.
356 See Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim
Precaution: An Empirical Analysis ofLojack, 113 Q. J. EcoN. 43,48 (1998).
357 VERMETTE, supra note 7, at 22.
358 See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
359 Indeed, neuroscience research suggests that while teens generally have difficulty learning from
experience due to the incomplete development of certain reward centers in the brain, providing
small financial incentives (e.g., a $25 gift card) makes it possible for them to learn from mistakes to
the same degree as adults. Slomski, supra note 131, at 3.
360 See Durna, supra note 120, at 114-18.
361 See McCartt et al., supra note 46, at 246 (finding that graduated driver licensing laws that
impose restrictions on driving with passengers and delay the age at which teens become eligible to
drive successfully reduce teenage driving fatalities); McCartt et al., supra note 63, at 217-18
(summarizing studies finding reductions in teenage accident and fatality rates as a result of GDL
laws delaying the age at which teens begin driving and/or requiring more driving experience before
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teen education programs could be accomplished with the same type of federal
financial incentives currently aimed at reducing drunk driving accidents and
increasing seat belt use, and any state could implement such changes on its own.
Of course, perhaps the most effective way to alter drivers' use of mobile
devices would be through a law mandating that safety features be built into
mobile devices and motor vehicles that would automatically disable the device if
the car were moving. In the current political climate, federal legislation or
regulation to accomplish that appears almost impossible.362 However, the same
result is likely to be achieved if courts change their current position on tort
liability and hold that mobile device manufactures and carriers, as well as
automobile manufacturers, owe a duty to the potential and highly foreseeable
victims of motor vehicle accidents caused by drivers' mobile device use to
prevent that harm. 63 Just as strict product liability law revolutionized the
behavior of product manufacturers 364 and dram shop and social host liability
statutes cut down on the behavior of furnishing alcohol to presently or potentially
inebriated drivers,365 so too a judicial decision extending liability to the
manufacturers and sellers of mobile devices would undoubtedly lead to the rapid
development and deployment of new technology to minimize or eliminate the use
of mobile devices while driving. Already such technology is available, although
it is still in relatively infancy.
366
Until that time, it is important to recognize the limits of the law. There is
no point in enacting draconian laws to "send a message" proclaiming that mobile
device-wielding drivers are villains if that does not lead to fewer deaths and
injuries; nor does it make sense to enact regulatory bans which lack any real
enforcement teeth.
teens receive full licenses); McCartt et al, Effects, supra note 217, at 146 (finding that a highly-
publicized program of enhanced enforcement of minimum drinking age and DUI laws resulted in a
significant decrease in underage drinking and drunk driving among drivers 16-24); McCartt &
Northrup, supra note 135, at 36 (suggesting that imposing higher penalties on teens for seat belt
violations might improve seat belt use rates); Williams, supra note 135, at i5-i7 (discussing the
potential of graduated licensing programs and enhanced driver education as a tool to mitigate
young driver risk factors). Some of these proposals are part of the Safe Teen and Novice Driver
Uniform Protection (STANDUP) Act, S. 528, 112th Cong. (2011).
362 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
363 See supra notes 176-86 and accompanying text (discussing courts' current refusal to extend
liability mobile device manufacturers and vendors liable in such circumstances).
364 See generally John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85
MICH. L. REv. 1820, 1820 n. 3 (1987).
365 See supra note 250.
366 These technologies include software that disables texting and web-browsing in a phone that is
traveling above a certain speed, dashboard buttons that drivers can push to prevent incoming calls
and texts, and key fobs paired with cell phones that disable the phone when the key is inserted into
a car ignition. See Larry Copeland, Software Aims to Block Texting While Driving, U.S.A. TODAY,
July 22, 2010, at A1; New Technology to Block Car Phone Use Far From Perfect, NAT'L SAFETY
COMM., (Jan. 27, 2009), http://alerts.nationalsafetycommision.comI/2009/01/new-technology-to-
block-car-hone-use.php.
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